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Chapter 1: Introduction
This document represents the Master Thesis of the Master in Computing, at Barcelona School of
Informatics (Facultat d'Informàtica de Barcelona) of the Technical University of Catalonia
(Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya). 
Cloud computing is a computing paradigm in which organizations can store their data remotely in
the cloud (Internet) and access applications, services and infrastructure on-demand from a shared
pool of computing resources. It is  clear that  cloud technologies have proven a major commercial
success over recent years (since the appearance of products and cloud offerings like Amazon EC2
[75] and Microsoft Azure [65]). According to Gardner, Cloud Computing will play a large part in the
ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) domain over the next 10 years or more, since
it provides cost-savings to enterprises thanks to virtualization technologies, opening gates for new
business opportunities as well.
However, Cloud Computing has to face several challenges and issues.  Storing and processing
data  out  of  the  boundaries  of  your  company  raises  security  and  privacy  concerns  by  itself.
Nowadays information is the commodity of XXI century, and certain information can mean power
and  market  advantage.  As  pointed  out  by  Andreas  Weiss,  Director  of  the  EuroCloud,  in  an
interview we held with him (refer to Appendix C), data is one of the most important and valuable
resource any company has. Therefore, security mechanisms to protect this data are necessary to
make the right choices and decisions for the company without worrying about data safety.  In the
paradigm of Cloud Computing we will have to trust a Cloud Service Provider (CSP), creating an
extra dependency to a third party which some customers, depending on the value of their data, will
inevitably feel uncomfortable.  Outsourcing business data in a place not  owned by oneself  can
scare organizations from using the benefits of Cloud Computing in an optimal way.
1.1. Motivation
Privacy and confidentiality (refer to section 3.1 and 3.2 for definitions) are continuous hot topics. As
of 2013, year of publication of this Master Thesis, media is flooded with a stream of news related to
privacy and confidentiality issues and confrontations. 
Just  to  enumerate  some  examples,  one  of  the  most  relevant  topics  is  the  case  of  Edward
Snowden,  an  ex-agent  of  the  United  States  NSA  (National  Security  Agency)  who  leaked
information and details  of  several  top-secret  U.S.  surveillance and espionage programs to the
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press. He defends that he did this to inform the public about what is done in their name and for the
purpose of transparency. Since June 2013, he is  wanted for  the charges of “theft of government
property, unauthorized communication of national defense information, and willful communication
of  classified intelligence to an unauthorized person”.  He is both called a hero and a traitor  by
sectors of population. Some related news are [61], [62].
Another relevant news can be read in [59], in which Google, as a defense against an action lawsuit
for the lack of privacy from Gmail users, declared that whoever uses a service like Gmail should
not expect privacy for an information that voluntarily is delivered to third-parties. Google explained
that  Gmail  Terms of  Service  (ToS) and  Privacy  Policies  (refer  to  section  2.5.2  for  definitions)
presents its automated mail process analysis and that the user, when he accepts the use of the
service, he is also obliged to accept these terms. A related news, in the same line, about Facebook
is [63].
As a last example,  in [60] we can read on a popular Spanish computing magazine that Sweden
forbids the use of Google Apps in the public sector, arguing that Google Apps fails to protect users'
privacy and questions the equality of conditions in the use of Google Services.
As  it  can  be  noted,  there  are  a  hefty  amount  of  issues  and  concerns  around  privacy  and
confidentiality of data, and they are a continuous subject of controversy in our society which raises
questions difficult to answer due to multiple moral implications [2]. Google Apps, Facebook, and
other software solutions delivered through Internet are considered Cloud solutions and are not
exempt  of  these  concerns.  Some  examples  of  these  questions  that may  arise  from  Cloud
customers:  “How secure is  my data? Can I  trust  my cloud provider? Which are the risks and
mitigations for  any existing issue on my data in  the cloud?”.  Privacy is a high concern in  the
security requirement of Cloud Computing. As we will see throughout this document, even though a
lot of effort has been put from governments, standard organizations and cloud industry into infusing
trust and attract more customers to use Cloud services, Cloud technologies and models have not
yet  reached  their  full  potential  and  have  not  yet  acquired  a  degree  to  satisfy all  potential
circumstances of usage.
For these reasons, this Master Thesis aims at providing a state-of-the-art about Cloud Computing
security, focusing on privacy and confidentiality matters which are the most significant ones. It will
serve as a good starting point for readers interested in getting general knowledge about Cloud
Computing  and  researchers  interested  in  contributing  on  Cloud  Computing privacy  and
confidentiality  matters, allowing them to acknowledge the current status regarding privacy of this
trendy paradigm. In this document we identify the issues and challenges privacy and confidentiality
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has to face and provide some basis about several relevant researches about the topic.
More specifically, in this Master Thesis we make use of several computing research sources to
look for definitions and research about Cloud Computing platforms and put all the pieces together
in order to provide a deep understanding about  privacy and confidentiality requirements,  issues
and challenges.
1.2. Thesis objectives and organization
The objective and main contribution of this master thesis consists in elaborating a state-of-the-art
about  the  privacy and confidentiality requirements,  issues and challenges applied to the  Cloud
Computing paradigm, identify the existing evidence on this topic and establish relationships among
works to find gaps and conflicting areas. 
In more detail, this document is structured as follows: 
1) Chapter 2 describes background information and definitions about the  Cloud Computing
paradigm,  with  the aim of  providing  basic  knowledge  to  fully  understand  the concepts
described in the following chapters.
2) Chapter  3 explains which has been the research methodology used in this document to
collect data for  the elaboration of the Systematic Literature Review and the results of its
application.
3) Chapter 4  explains the performed Systematic  Literature Review.  The chapter  describes
definitions about privacy and confidentiality applied to the paradigm of Cloud Computing,
classifies the issues and challenges found in the literature and outlines the solutions found
for these issues or research gaps in the different identified areas.
4) Chapter 5  exposes conclusions we obtained in the Systematic Literature Review through
an analysis and outlines the research gaps, open areas and issues we identified.
5) Chapter 6 exposes final remarks about the work done for this Master Thesis and describes
future work that could be done related to what we have explained so far.
6) Additionally,  appendixes have been included with glossary,  a short  overview of different
Cloud vendors and an interview with the director of EuroCloud, Andreas Weiss.
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In  this  sense,  the  contributions made in  this  Master  Thesis will  benefit  the  Cloud  Computing
community, customers and Cloud industry. Through this document:
 Cloud customers will be able to grasp a better idea about  privacy and data confidentiality
protection  technologies  available  in  Cloud Computing paradigm as well  as the existing
issues, which will allow them to plan ahead, make better decisions and gain trustiness in
the cloud.
 Researchers interested in the field of privacy and confidentiality in Cloud Computing will be
able to acknowledge  research areas and  challenges in privacy  and confidentiality  which
may need further work.
 Cloud  industry  will  be  able  to  identify  existing  issues  and  vulnerabilities  regarding  the
protection  of  customer's  data  privacy  and  offered  the  chance  to  follow  researchers'
suggestions to provide better services to build up trust and increase the amount of Cloud
adopters.
1.3. Starting point
Cloud Computing is a concept which has been around for some time. A hefty amount of work,
reviews and research have been done in the topic of Cloud Computing, specially on concerns
regarding security in the Cloud.  So,  in order to get a starting basis and begin the work of this
Master Thesis, we have read papers which review concepts about Cloud Computing like those
defined  in  the  references,  e.g. [1]  and  [10].  However,  as  Cloud  Computing  is  a  fairly  recent
paradigm of interest, research is disperse and there exists gaps which must still be covered in
order to make cloud a full and complete reality. Bringing all the knowledge together in an organized
way will help to better understand the issues that revolve around this paradigm.
In addition,  some  works used in  this  Master Thesis  like [SLR16],  [SLR19]  or  [SLR20] already
provide reviews on security, privacy and confidentiality issues in Cloud Computing, which will help
us providing a more accurate classification of works related to the topic for this Master Thesis.
Privacy and Confidentiality issues in Cloud Computing architectures 17
CHAPTER 2
CLOUD COMPUTING:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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Chapter 2: Cloud Computing:  Background  information  and
definitions
In  this  chapter,  in order  to  completely  understand  our  systematic  review  about  privacy  and
confidentiality in Cloud Computing, we will introduce background information to position the reader
into the context.  We will not provide a deep background on Cloud Computing as it is out of the
scope of this Master Thesis, but the general concepts that will enable readers to firmly grasp the
idea of what is cloud computing and its benefits, and understand the rest of this document. If you
are interested in  getting more knowledge on Cloud Computing,  we firmly recommend reading
[SLR16].
Also, this chapter will  mention several examples of Cloud solutions. Appendix B of this Master
Thesis  makes a short  overview on some of  the most  popular  Cloud vendors with the goal  of
providing a better understanding and insight on the topic.
This chapter is structured as follows:
1) Section 2.1 defines what is Cloud Computing and its main characteristics.
2) Section 2.2 enumerates the actors that come into play in the Cloud Computing paradigm
and describe its functions and responsibilities.
3) Section  2.3 describes  the  three  most  popular  cloud  delivery  models  by  which  Cloud
providers offer their services.
4) Section 2.4 describes  the most popular cloud deployment models,  the  different channels
Cloud providers have to offer their services.
5) Section  2.5  describes  which  are  the  main  components  that  make  Cloud  Computing
possible.
2.1. Definitions of Cloud Computing
Various definitions and interpretations of “clouds” and / or “cloud computing” exist. Depending on
the usage scope, we will try to give a representative set of definitions.
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Mather et al. [SLR16] provide a
working and official definition of cloud computing [35]: 
Cloud Computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications,
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction. 
Other  works like  [1]  and  [38]  define  Cloud  Computing  as  platform  or  infrastructure  in  which
dynamically scalable (elastic) resources are provided as a service through Internet, enabling users
to process the data outside the boundaries of the company, providing economical benefits  through
virtualized  and  shared  infrastructure  without  the  need  of  expertise  nor  knowledge  over  the
underlying technology.
In either definition, both describe a paradigm in which users can demand services through Internet
(servers,  applications,  infrastructure,  development  platforms)  whenever  they  need  it,  like  a
commodity. Take the example of the recently published  app  Cloud Photoshop, a popular image
designer and editor. Customers will use Photoshop and pay for what they use and need, no more,
no  less.  This  saves  the  necessity  of  buying  expensive  1000€  licenses,  which  represents
cost-savings.
Just  to  provide  an  easy  to  understand  comparison,  Cloud  Computing  is  the  water  or  gas of
computing. At home you usually don't have a water pump, nor a gas generator, but your home is
connected with a set of pipes where the water and gas arrive, previously demanding or contracting
a service to a provider company, and usually you pay for what you consume. The more water and
gas you consume, the more you pay. The idea of Cloud Computing is pretty much the same,
replacing  water  and gas  for  services  or  infrastructure  and replacing  the pipes  for  an  Internet
connection.
The figure 2-1 is a summary of Cloud different capabilities and features. Throughout this chapter
we will overview them.
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Figure 2-1: Features and capabilities of Cloud Systems
In their book, Mather et al. [SLR16] and NIST [35] define Cloud Computing with a set of essential
characteristics that describe this paradigm, which fit into the definitions explained above:
 Multitenancy  (shared resources):  One of  the benefits  of  Cloud Computing is  that  it  is
based on a business model where resources are shared among multiple users at the same
time. This is usually reached through virtualization. 
 Massive  scalability:  Cloud  Computing  provides  the  ability  to  scale  to  thousands  of
systems, and massively scale bandwidth and storage space.
 Elasticity: Users can rapidly increase and decrease their computing resources as needed,
providing IT resources on demand and address spikes in usage, and release resources
when they are not required any more. Elasticity can be achieved by using Load Balancers,
which is a mechanism to self-regulating properly the workloads among servers, hard drives,
network, and other IT resources.
 Pay-as-you-go: Users pay for the resources they use and only for the time they required
them.
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 Self-provisioning of resources: Users self-provision resource like processors, software,
storage, network resources... without much intervention from the Cloud Provider.
 Location-Independent  Resource  Pooling:  the  resources  may  be  located  at  multiple
places, being this physical separation transparent to the consumer.
 Ubiquitous Network Access:  Customers can access their demanded services wherever
they need them, being either a web browser, several offices on a company, etc...
Figure 2-2: Spendings increase in cloud computing services compared with on-site infrastructure
Thanks to Cloud Computing, you can access and make use of powerful computing infrastructure at
a  very  reduced  cost  compared  to  buying  the  whole  infrastructure  yourself,  and  acquire  it  on
demand, avoiding the costs of infrastructure obsolescence (when you buy a computer, that piece of
hardware has less  value  for  every  day it  passes).  As  the time passes,  the  interest  of  Cloud
Computing raises among companies and it is foresighted that cloud technologies will increase its
presence. Figure 2-2 illustrates the increase the spendings in Cloud technologies compared with
the on-site IT solutions.
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2.2. Actors
According to the NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture [10], five major actors have been
identified who carry out unique and specific cloud computing activities. This section will summarize
the responsibilities of these actors. Figure 2-3 illustrates the actors and their responsibilities. 
The main two actors are:
 Cloud Service Costumer: They purchase and use services from a Cloud Service Provider
or a Cloud Broker. The Cloud Service Costumer could be a company that is interested in
moving to a cloud-based solution, e.g. an SaaS solution, such as e-mail.
 Cloud Service Provider (CSP): provides the cloud services (service layer),  manages the
resource allocation  and control  (Resource abstraction and control layer) and  the physical
infrastructure (physical resource layer) that conforms the cloud, and they are responsible
for  the Cloud Service Management  (resource provisioning,  monitoring,  business related
services and migration of services between clouds).
Figure 2-3: NIST Cloud Computing Actors Model
Other actors that take part into the Cloud model are:
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 Cloud Broker: responsible of integrating and combining cloud services to create enhanced
services and providing value-added services to consumers. It behaves as a provider when
interacting with a consumer or as a consumer when interacting with a cloud provider.
 Cloud Auditor: evaluates and audits the services provided by a cloud provider in terms of
security, privacy, performance, etc.,  to ensure that the vendor  operates as  expected and
that security requirements are met. According to NIST, auditing is especially important for
federal  agencies,  and  they should include a contractual clause  allowing third parties to
assess security controls of cloud providers.
 Cloud Carrier: provides connectivity and transport of cloud services from Cloud Providers
to Cloud Consumers e.g. an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Cloud carriers provide access
to  consumers  through  network,  telecommunication  and  other  access  devices.  A cloud
provider usually  sets up Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with a cloud carrier to provide
services consistent with the level of SLAs offered to cloud consumers. Consumers may
require the cloud carrier to provide dedicated and encrypted connections.
2.3. Delivery models
CSPs offer  their  services  according  to  three  fundamental  delivery  models,  depending  on the
abstraction level provided and the service model of providers [43]:  Infrastructure as a Service,
Platform as a Service, and Software as a Service. Figure 2-4 illustrates the layered organization of
the  cloud  stack  from  physical  infrastructure  to  applications,  alongside  definitions  (which  are
explained in more detail below) and examples of existing market solutions. This model represents
the level of  abstraction,  and can be viewed as a layered architecture where services of a higher
layer can be composed from services of the underlying layer.
The descriptions of these delivery models are:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
In the IaaS  delivery model,  the CSP  provides superior IT infrastructure  (storage, processing
power,  memory...) to  run  applications  and  Operating  Systems  (OS)  commonly through
virtualization technologies like Vmware [77]. 
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Figure 2-4: The cloud computing delivery models pyramid
Some examples of IaaS are: Amazon S3 [64], SQL Azure [65], Terremark [66], Rackspace [67].
Do not confuse hiring a server for a specific amount of time for specific and fixed resources with
IaaS. IaaS has several advantages over traditional hosting:
 It scales and adapts the infrastructure like memory, storage, processor and other computing
resources  on-demand  to  fulfil  capability  requirements  almost  at  a  real-time  speed
(elasticity).
 You purchase and pay for the amount of infrastructure required at any time.
Platform as a Service (PaaS)
In the PaaS delivery model, cloud vendors offer a browser-based development studio solution to
application developers,  upon which applications and services can be developed, hosted  and
offered to customers through the provider's platform. PaaS typically makes use of dedicated
APIs  (Application  Programming  Interfaces),  development  toolkits  and  standards for  usually
building web-based applications. These tools are aimed at providing monitoring of application
and user activities, integration with external web services and databases, scalability, reliability
and security, billing mechanisms and multi-tenancy without too much development. 
Some examples of PaaS are Microsoft Azure [66], Google App Engine [68] or Force.com [69]
PaaS delivery model has several advantages:
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 Allows the rapid propagation of software applications due to the low cost.
 Allows single developers and start-up companies to deploy web-based applications without
the cost and complexity of buying and setting up servers.
 Allows software vendors  to  control,  limit  the  use,  prohibit  copying  and distribution  and
facilitates the control of versions of their software.
Software as a Service (SaaS)
Traditionally, customers purchase software licenses and install them in their own hardware. In
the SaaS delivery model, users rent the software under a subscription or a pay-per-use model
(sometimes free for a limited time or under several conditions like allowing advertisement) and
access  the  software  through  Internet  (for  example  with  a  web  browser)  under  some
authorization mechanism [SLR16]. More specifically, Cloud Providers offer implementations of
specific business functions and business processes in the form of applications or services under
an established cloud infrastructure or platform. 
Some examples of SaaS are Google Docs [70], MobileMe, redirecting to iCloud [71], Zoho [72]
and Salesforce CRM [73].
SaaS delivery model has several advantages:
 Allows organizations to outsource the hosting and management of applications to the CSP,
reducing licensing, personnel and infrastructure costs.
 Allows software vendors  to  control,  limit  the  use,  prohibit  copying  and distribution  and
facilitates the control of versions of their software.
 Management of a SaaS application is supported by the vendor. However they cannot be
completely customized.
 Unlike  single-tenant  architecture  applications,  SaaS  physical  back-end  infrastructure  is
shared among different customers (but logically unique for the customers), maximizing the
sharing of resources among them.
These are the most common types of Clouds provided by most providers, yet there exists other
types of clouds which derive from the former three [4, 39], but we will not describe them in detail in
this Master Thesis.
Just to illustrate a bit more the differences among the three delivery models, Figure 2-4 illustrates
the level of control of several parts of the infrastructure. When the infrastructure is locate right in
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organization's  offices,  organization  has  full  control  of  everything  (except  network,  which  is
obviously managed by the ISP).  When hiring hosted infrastructure, user controls the operating
system which can host Virtual Machines and applications, but the control of the physical server
relies  more  on  the  Hosting  provider.  When  moving  to  a  IaaS,  customers  can  control  the
applications that run inside a Virtual Machine, but not the Virtual Machine manager itself nor the
physical machine. On a PaaS, customers control applications and services under cloud vendors
platform (which limits the control). Finally, on SaaS users don't have control of applications and
they can just use it.
Figure 2-5: Areas of control between customer and vendor depending on the delivery model
2.4. Deployment Models
This section will describe the ways previously explained delivery models can be deployed in the
cloud. There have been identified four deployments models in the literature:
Private Clouds
Also  known  as  internal  clouds,  private  clouds  are  designed  for  exclusive  use  (storage,
computing...)  by a single organization  on a private network.  A private cloud offers the highest
degree of  control  over  performance,  reliability  and security.  However,  they are  purchased and
completely managed by the organisation, so private clouds don't benefit from lower costs due to
shared  environments  unlike  other  models  and  requires  internal  IT  expertise  or  delegate  the
management to third parties.
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Example: eBay [74].
Public Clouds 
Public  clouds provide on-demand  services to the general  public  over a common infrastructure
hosted,  operated and managed by a third-party vendor.  Security  management  and day-to-day
operations are relegated to the vendor.  Public  clouds offer  several  key benefits to  customers,
including  no  initial  capital  investment  on  infrastructure,  lower  costs and  shifting  of  risks  to
providers' infrastructure. 
However, customers have a low degree of control in these kind of control compared with private
clouds, which raises a huge amounts of security and privacy concerns that are the basis of this
document,  as  public  clouds  are  the  main  traditional  way  of  deploying  Cloud  Computing
architectures.
Examples: Amazon EC2 [75], Windows Azure [65].
Hybrid Clouds 
A hybrid  cloud is  a  combination  of  public  and private  cloud models  that  tries  to  address  the
limitations of each approach. In a hybrid cloud, part of the service infrastructure runs in private
clouds (e.g. core applications, sensitive data) while the remaining part runs in public clouds (e.g.
non-core applications).  Hybrid clouds  provide  more control and security over data compared to
public clouds while still facilitating on-demand service and elasticity. However, the design of hybrid
clouds  require  to  carefully  determine  what  should  be  split  into  public  and  private  cloud
components.
Examples: Juniper [76].
Community clouds
Community clouds are a less common type of cloud compared to the other deployment models
(and somewhat experimental). In these kind of clouds, an organization shares infrastructure among
several  organizations from a specific  community  with common concerns (security,  compliance,
jurisdiction, etc.), and can be either managed internally or by a third-party, and hosted internally or
externally. The costs are spread over fewer users than a public cloud (but more than a private
cloud),  so there are cost-savings,  but  in  a lower  degree than public  clouds,  but  more control
compared to public clouds.
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Examples: Zimory [68], RightScale [69]
2.5. Cloud components
[1][SLR16]  Cloud  Computing does not refer to a specific technology, but a  combination  of
pre-existing technologies  and protocols that made this paradigm possible. In this section we will
describe the most relevant technological and non-technological components which support Cloud
Computing architectures.
Just as a small remark, non-technological aspects described in section 2.5.2 were defined before
the Cloud Era,  but they are applicable as well  under this paradigm (with several remarks and
appointments which will be reviewed through Chapter 4).
2.5.1. Technological components
Data centres and server farms 
Cloud services require large amounts of computing capacity in order to provide high flexibility
and  power,  and  are  hosted in  data  centres  and server  farms (which  can be distributed in
multiple locations).
For example, Google links a large number of servers to provide their services, or Amazon EC2
provides virtualization in a data centre to create a huge amount of virtual instances.
Virtualization technologies 
The  most  important  technology  that  makes  cloud  computing  possible.  Virtualization
technologies  abstracts  physical  computing  resources  (CPU,  storage,  network,  memory,
databases...)  from  applications  and  end  users,  providing  the  capability  of  creating  pooled
resources accessible to anything authorized to use them. 
This capability provides the multi-tenancy properties of cloud-computing, providing scalable and
shared resource platform capabilities for all tenants.
Virtualizations technologies are supported by the hypervisor,  a layer of software between an
operating system and hardware platform that is used to operate Virtual Machines like launch or
terminating,  and implements  and manages virtual  CPU (vCPU),  virtual  memory (vMemory),
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event  channels  and  memory  shared  by  the  hosted  Virtual  Machines  (VMs),  controls  data
Input/Output and memory access to devices.
When talking about virtualization applications, common users think on applications to create
guest OS Virtual Machines like VMWare or VirtualBox, creating instances of Operating Systems
that  share  resources with  the host  physical  machine and  other  Virtual  Machines.  However
virtualization does not limit to operating systems, but other components that can be virtualized,
like storage (Storage Area Networks), databases, and software (Apache Tomcat, WebSphere,
Jboss...). 
Depending on the delivery model, virtualization appears at various layers.  In IaaS  commonly
storage and OS is virtualized, while on SaaS and PaaS databases and software are the typically
virtualized component.
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
APIs provide features to customers, like self-provisioning and control of services and resources,
and allow communication between foreign applications and the cloud service. The type of APIs
depend on the delivery model, and can go from simple URL manipulations to SOA (Service
Oriented Architecture) programming models.
However each CSP usually has its unique API and no standards exist on this matter , which
makes cloud applications not portable among clouds, harming interoperability and locking-in the
customer  into  the  vendor's  cloud.  Also,  IT  staff  is  required  to  become familiar  with  those
platform-specific  features  (although  some  organisations  like  the  Universal  Cloud  Interface,
which attempts to unite APIs from different cloud providers to create and open and standardized
cloud interface).
Encryption 
Encryption  is  the  process  of  encoding  messages  or  information  in  a  way  that  that  only
authorized parties can read that information, preventing unwanted parties and hackers read it.
This is usually done with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message will be
encoded. Then, the authorized party uses a secret decryption key to decipher the message and
read it. Encryption is the common technique used to protect the confidentiality of messages.
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2.5.2. Non-technological components
Service-level Agreements (SLA) 
The mutual contract between providers and users is usually called SLAs which offers guarantees
on the quality of the service by defining what is to be expected from the offered service,  and
defines  compensatory  schemas  in  case  the  provider  violates  these  contract  pre-defined
agreements.  Some examples  of  these  agreements  could  be  99% of  availability,  resolution  of
incidents under a specified period of time, data security, etc. 
Privacy Policies 
Wikipedia [45]  provides an excellent  definition of  the term policy,  which will  be very recurrent
throughout  this  document. A policy  is  a  statement  of  intentions,  implemented as  protocols  or
procedures, to guide decisions and achieve a desired goal. When applied under the privacy topic
[46], these policies represent legal documents that explains and discloses the way a party gathers,
uses,  discloses  and  manages  customer's  data  (e.g.  name,  address,  medical  history,  financial
records,  commercial  transactions,  etc.).  It  also  informs  the  client  about  what  information  is
collected  and  whether  it  is  kept  confidential,  shared  with  partners  or  sold  to  other  firms  of
enterprises.  These aspects are usually collected under a written document which outlines rules,
provides principles that guide actions, sets roles and responsibilities, reflect values and beliefs and
state a protocol of actions [47].
In this sense, privacy policies forge the individual's physical and moral autonomy, so a set of laws
in different countries have been developed over the years to protect  and enforce these policies
(refer to section 4.3.2.2.2), although there exists differences in the way these privacy laws are
implemented and enforced in different countries.  While the European Union enforces that data
protection laws must be met by any business operating or transferring personal information about
any EU citizen or business, in United States privacy laws only apply to the public sector, not the
private sector.
Terms and conditions
Also known as Terms of Service (ToS),  they are rules which an entity must agree and accept in
order  to  use a  service.  The terms-of-service  agreement  is  mainly  used for  legal  purposes by
websites and Internet service providers that store a user's personal data (e.g. e-commerce sites
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and  social networking services). A legitimate terms-of-service agreement is legally binding, and
may be subject to change.
A  terms-of-service  agreement  typically  contains  sections  explaining  the  user  rights  and
responsibilities  of expected usage and potential misuse of the service; accountability for actions,
behavior, and conduct; a privacy policy outlining the use of personal data; possible payment details
such as membership or subscription fees, etc.; possibly a policy describing procedure for account
termination;  disclaimer/limitation  of  Liability  clarifying  the  service's legal  liability  for  damages
incurred by users; and user notification when the terms are modified.
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Chapter 3: The review method: Systematic Literature Review
This chapter describes the methodology, and the search and work selection strategies we used to
elaborate  the  state-of-the-art  over  privacy  and  confidentiality  issues  in  Cloud  Computing
architectures presented in the Chapter 4 of this document. We used the  Systematic Literature
Review methodology (SLR). The exposed results in this chapter were gathered in 11/10/2012.
The reason to perform a systematic literature review over privacy  and confidentiality  on cloud
computing  is to provide an state-of-the-art about this area,  identify  which are the  privacy  and
confidentiality requirements that practitioners take into account to accordingly plan their
architectures and make their decisions and summarize the existing evidence about the topic. SLR
methodology is described on B. Kitchenham's guidelines [21],  which proposes systematic review
guidelines specific for software engineer researchers. 
Kitchenham defines Systematic Literature Review as follows:
A systematic literature review (often referred to as a systematic review) is a means of identifying,
evaluating and interpreting all available research relevant to a particular research question, or topic
area, or phenomenon of interest. Individual studies contributing to a systematic review are called
primary studies; a systematic review is a form of secondary study.
There are several features that  differentiate a systematic review from a conventional literature
review:
 Definition of  the review protocol: Review protocol specifies the research question being
addressed and the methods that will be used to perform the review.
 Definition of the search strategy: Search strategy aims to detect as much of the relevant
literature as possible.
 Documented searches, so that readers can assess its rigour and completeness.
 Explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria to assess each potential primary study (a systematic
review is a secondary study based on primary studies).
 Systematic  reviews  specify  the  information  to  be  obtained  from  each  primary  study
including quality criteria by which to evaluate each primary study.
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 A systematic review is a prerequisite for quantitative meta-analysis.
Sticking with fidelity to the guidelines allows to perform reviews which can be replicated by other
people which allows for an easy expansion of recent work (through performing the SLR at another
point of time) and assess the veracity of results.
The  systematic  review  takes  three  main  phases,  each  one  of  them  associated  with  several
activities:
1) Planning the review: identify the need for  the review, specify research question and,  in
general, develop a review protocol. This chapter is focused on describing this phase.
2) Conducting  the review:  this  phase consists  on the  selection  of  primary studies,  quality
extraction and data synthesis.  Chapter  3 explains  the selection of  primary studies and
quality extraction, chapter 4 on data synthesis and chapter 5 on the analysis of review
results.
3) Reporting the review: format the main report. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are formatted following
advisors' guidelines based on Kitchenham's guidelines. 
3.1. Review protocol
As stated in [21], “A review protocol specifies the methods that will be used to undertake a specific
systematic review. A pre-defined protocol is necessary to reduce the possibility researcher bias.”
So, the following points are indicated in the guidelines for the development of the protocol:
3.1.1. The review question
It is obvious that before finding a solution, we need to define which is the question we want to
answer. Initially, we wanted to do a SLR on overall security aspects on Cloud Computing, so the
questions were:
 How does security affect the architecture of Cloud Computing?
 Which  are  the  currently  identified  issues  regarding  security  aspects  which  should  be
addressed?
 Which are some of the solutions proposed to solve these issues?
However,  security  matters  are  broad,  encapsulating  a  lot  of  fields.  For  practical  matters,  we
decided  later  to  switch  the  questions  and  focus  on  the  security  sub-area  Privacy  and
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Confidentiality. The main reasons for this changes were the amount of references found on the first
generic searches, as explained on section 3.1.2.3. The final questions for the SLR of this master
thesis are:
 What is the impact of privacy and confidentiality requirements in Cloud Computing
architectures?
 Which are the currently identified issues  and  challenges  regarding  privacy  and
confidentiality  in Cloud Computing platforms.  What  are  some  of  the  solutions
proposed to solve these issues?
The answer to these questions will provide a good background about the current status of privacy
and  confidentiality requirements  on  the  Cloud  Computing  paradigm  and  identify  which  is  the
current  direction  Cloud  Computing  is  heading  towards  providing  trustiness  on  organizations'
information and data. This answer will be interesting for cloud adopters, researchers and engineers
as explained in section 3.1.2.
In order to be able to answer the review question, first we had acquired in Chapter 2 an idea about
what is Cloud Computing, what  it is  its architecture and the necessary requirements to define its
architecture. Then, with all this knowledge and further literature, we will identify possible uncovered
research gaps on privacy and confidentiality.
This will allow to  summarize  the  existing  evidence  and  knowledge  concerning  law  issues,
technological aspects  and provide a  background which could  lead and position  new research
activities and identify possible unknown gaps. 
3.1.2. The search and data extraction strategy
In order to find proper information to answer our question, we need to define a search strategy.
The strategy outline we followed was:
1) Selection of proper information sources (see section 3.1.2.1).
2) Find keywords in order to formulate a search expression which will retrieve the papers we
need about the topic as most specific as possible (see section 3.1.2.2).
3) Elaborate a search expression to retrieve relevant literature about the topic (see section
3.1.2.3)
4) Select articles based on their title: in order to reduce the number of articles (see section
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3.1.2.4, EC1).
5) Read the abstract,  the conclusions and check keywords:  sometimes the title is too
generic or leads to confusion (see section 3.1.2.4, EC2).
6) Read the article:  the selected publications from step  5 were read in depth  in order to
assess if they provide useful value for our SLR or not (section 3.1.2.4, EC3).
7) Retrieve new publications from references (snowballing): as I'm reading publications,
we may find useful and interesting to read some referred articles to get deeper insight of a
topic (see section 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6).
8) Classify the papers:  once a paper has been read,  classify it in order to then be able  to
retrieve them quickly as needed in  2 categories:  Reviews, and Proposals and Solutions,
and  then  a  sub-classification  for  each  category:  Least  interesting,  interesting  and  very
interesting. Some papers may be included in more than one category (see section 3.1.2.7). 
Next subsections describe with more detail the strategy process.
3.1.2.1. Information sources
For this Systematic Literature Review, initially we considered using 2 paper database sources in
order to find literature which could help to answer our review question:
Inspec Database 
Inspec is  a  major  indexing database  of  scientific  and  technical  literature,  published  by  the
Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET). Inspec coverage is extensive in the fields of
physics  and  computer,  control,  and  mechanical  engineering.  Its  subject  coverage  includes
astronomy,  electronics,  communications,  ergonomics,  computers  &  computing,  computer
science, control engineering, electrical engineering, information technology, and physics.
Inspec covers the following databases:
− ACM Digital Library
− Compendex*Plus
− IEEE Xplore
− MathSciNet
− Web of Science
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ISI Web of Knowledge
ISI Web of Knowledge is an academic citation indexing and search service, which is combined
with  web  linking.  Web of  Knowledge covers  areas like sciences,  social  sciences,  arts  and
humanities,  and provides  bibliographic  content  and  tools  to  access,  analyse,  and  manage
research  information.  Moreover,  multiple  databases  can  be  searched  simultaneously,  being
Web of Science and Inspec among them.
However,  both databases  (specially the ISI Web of Knowledge)  use non-specialized databases
which provided too many irrelevant hits with our search expression (refer to section 3.1.2.3), so we
finally decided to use the following databases which are specialized on the domain of computing:
IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library and Springerlink.
IEEE Xplore
IEEE Xplore is a research database that indexes, abstracts, and provides full-text for articles
and papers on computer science, electrical engineering and electronics. The database mainly
covers  material  from  the  Institute  of  Electrical  and  Electronics  Engineers  (IEEE)  and  the
Institution  of  Engineering  and  Technology.  The  IEEE Xplore database  contains  over  three
million records.
ACM Digital Library
The ACM Digital Library contains full-text collection of all articles published by the Association
for Computing Machinery (ACM),  and includes almost 200.000 records of full-text access to
conference  proceedings,  magazines,  newsletters,  and  journals,  and  covers  topics  from
computer technology, online education, software engineering, programming, networking and
information to name some areas.
Springerlink
Springerlink develops, manages and disseminates knowledge, publishes books, e-books and
peer-reviewed journals in science, technical and medical publishing. They work with the world’s
best academics and authors in long-standing loyal partnerships based on mutual trust and they
are always open to new input. Springer also hosts a number of scientific databases, including
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SpringerLink,  Springer  Protocols,  and  SpringerImages.  Book  publications  include  major
reference works, textbooks, monographs and book series; more than 50,000 titles are available
as e-books in 13 subject collections.
3.1.2.2. Keyword finding
In order to find good keywords for  our searches, and have some clue about where to start and
being able in the future to classify correctly search results, we read some papers, publications and
books about Cloud Computing security, gathered from Internet and Experts (this Master Thesis's
advisors).  Table  3-1  describes  which are  the publications  that  were used  for  this  purpose as
starting point entries.
Document type References
Books [37]
Papers [1], [43], [36]
Table 3-1: Publications used for background setting and keyword finding
The results of this first search were:
 We gathered knowledge about security aspects and requirements in cloud computing which
would then come up with keywords to refine my searches.  The paper that provided the
most benefits for our keyword finding was [36] as it provides more details regarding security
than the other publications. This paper identifies 9 sub-areas related to security in cloud
computing:
◦ Access control
◦ Attack Detection
◦ Non-repudiation
◦ Integrity
◦ Security Auditing
◦ Physical Protection
◦ Privacy and Confidentiality
◦ Recovery
◦ Prosecution
Finally, the keywords found useful for finding results for our systematic review are: 
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Requirement,  security,  cloud  computing,  access  control,  attack,  detection,  repudiation,
integrity, audit, physical, protection, privacy, confidentiality, recovery, prosecution, law
We decided to split the keywords “Attack Detection” and “Physical Protection” in order to
increase the amount of papers retrieved for the search expression. 
◦ In  the  case  of  Attack  Detection,  some  papers  refer  to  attack  detection  as  “attack
protection”, “intrusion detection”, “DDoS attack” and similar. Dividing the two keywords
allows for a wider range of results.
◦ In  the  case  of  “Physical  Protection”,  some  papers  refer  to  physical  protection  as
“physical  attack  protection”,  “secure  physical  data”,  or  just  “hardware  protection”  to
enumerate some of them. Dividing the two keywords allows for a wider range of results.
Also, as explained in section 3.1.2.3, we decided to move to Privacy and Confidentiality.
Given that some papers include the word “law” as a common word, we decided to include it
as a keyword to consider. 
 We improved my own background about the topic so we can define better exclusion criteria
and provide background information for our Systematic Literature Review.
3.1.2.3. The search expression
As a means to retrieve the papers, we formulated a first query to the paper databases based on
the title of this master thesis, my knowledge gathered from reading the documents in Table 1 and
the keywords found in section 3.1.2.2. In this subsection we are describing the search expressions
used for this literature review as well as the amount of results for each expression.
For this Master Thesis, firstly we considered to perform a general review about security, so the first
search  results  we  wanted  were papers  which  could  provide  me a  general  background  about
security  requirements. So, the first expression  we used  was  (Cloud computing) AND (security
OR privacy). Table 3-2 shows the results of this query.
Search expression ACM DL Inspec IEEExplore
(Cloud  computing)  AND  (security OR
privacy)
1184 hits 2398 hits 419 hits
Table 3-2: Results for the first used search expression
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As this search provided too many results, a too broad scope and a good amount of them weren't
really focused on  cloud computing,  we  decided,  first, to switch and limit the databases used as
explained in section 3.1.2.1,  and then we  modified the expression  to  (Cloud computing) AND
(confidentiality OR privacy). Table 3-3 shows the obtained results for this query.
Search expression IEEExplore ACM DL Springerlink
(Cloud computing) AND (confidentiality 
OR privacy)
48 hits 825 hits 1383 hits
Table 3-3: Results for the second used search expression
These results still proved to be not so specific to cloud computing or privacy (specially in the case
of ACM), so we decided to focus on one sub-area of security in cloud computing. We performed a
search for every sub-area of security as explained in section 3.1.2.2, use the resulting keywords
and choose one of them to perform the systematic review based on the amount of results.  Table
3-4 outlines the queries we performed and their corresponding results.
Search expression IEEExplore ACM DL Springerlink
"cloud computing" AND security AND "Access
control"
146 hits 325 hits 647 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND Attack 
AND detection
50 hits 291 hits 316 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND 
repudiation
8 hits 19 hits 50 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND integrity 104 hits 409 hits 674 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND audit* 104 hits 238 hits 340 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND physical
AND protect*
14 hits 253 hits 391 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND (privacy 
OR confidentiality)
66 hits 719 hits  1236 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND recovery 21 hits 285 hits 494 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND 
prosecution
1 hits 7 hits 18 hits
Table 3-4: Results for several search expressions
Privacy and Confidentiality issues in Cloud Computing architectures 43
After analysing the results and based on my personal preference, we choose to focus on privacy
and confidentiality and continue with the expression "cloud computing" AND security AND (privacy
OR confidentiality). However, we decided to perform a last modification on the search expression
to get more specific results and ultimately use "cloud computing" AND security AND privacy
AND confidentiality (without duplicates). Table 3-5 shows the results of this expression for our
sources.
Search expression IEEExplore ACM DL Springerlink
"cloud computing" AND security AND privacy
AND confidentiality 
51 hits 192 hits 134 hits
"cloud computing" AND security AND privacy
AND confidentiality (without duplicates)
44 hits 192 hits 120 hits
Table 3-5: Results for the chosen search expression
In total, the searches returned 377 papers, so we decided to hold
on  this  search expression  as  the final  expression  used  for  the
systematic review of this Master Thesis. After removing duplicates,
for a total  of  356 papers.  Figure  3-1 represents graphically the
papers based on their source.
ACM Digital Library provided the highest amount of papers. This
does not mean, though, that we will find there the highest amount
of useful papers for our review as we will see on the next sections.
3.1.2.4. Exclusion criteria
In order to select the proper papers for our systematic review, we defined the following exclusion
criteria:
 Selection by title (EC1): Discarded those whose title points to a conference's workshop, or
to  a  very  specific  and  limited  domain  of  application  (like  Healthcare,  Banking...),  or  it
doesn't make any reference to the cloud computing paradigm, or it doesn't refer to either
privacy or confidentiality or specifically to security.
 Selection by abstract and conclusions (EC2): Selected all those papers whose abstract
and conclusions fulfil the following requirements:
Springerlink ACM DL
IEEExplore
Figure 3-1: Relation of papers 
gathered from sources
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◦ Makes a reference to cloud computing.
◦ Mentions either privacy or confidentiality as the focus of the paper, or at least providing
a state-of-the-art about general security aspects.
◦ It's not too technical focused nor too much specific to a certain domain (healthcare,
banking...).
◦ Mentions some relevant research direction on security, privacy or confidentiality.
◦ The conclusions provide an overall idea about what it should have been read in the
work.
 Selection by full-text (EC3): papers whose text does not aim to provide an explanation to
security nor  privacy, or are too technical focused or not specific to cloud computing were
discarded.
Table  3-6 describes,  which  have  been  the  results  of  each  applied  exclusion  step  for  each
database, and the amount of discarded papers from the previous step in %:
Exclusion steps IEEExplore ACM DL Springerlink Total % Discarded
0. Starting point 44 papers 192 papers 120 papers 356 papers -
1. EC1 17 papers 16 papers 34 papers 67 papers 81.17%
2. EC2 11 papers 7 papers 9 papers 27 papers 59.7%
3. EC3 9 papers 1 papers 5 papers 15 papers 55.6%
 
Table 3-6: Results obtained from the initial process after applying the exclusion criteria 
As it can be stated, a huge amount of papers were strangely discarded from ACM DL, and after
verifying some random papers from the discarded pile,  we concluded that ACM searches also
through the document, adding to the search results papers who barely make a mention to cloud
computing (maybe due to a full-text search).
The rest of steps in the table are trivial to explain. After applying the three filters, there are  15
papers left  from the initial  356,  which represents a 4.2%  from the total  once duplicates were
removed. These 15 papers will be included on our SLR. Figure 3-2 represents the whole process
of exclusion.
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Figure 3-2: The selection process of the initial search
Some conclusions could be extracted from this process. The first conclusion is that, even though
IEEExplore provided the smallest amount of papers for our research question, it ended being the
one with the highest amount of chosen papers after applying our exclusion criteria. This makes us
think  on  two  aspects  regarding  IEEExplore:  either  its database  is  good  and  contains  more
specialized content than the other databases, or its search engine is more accurate than the other
databases, or both. 
Another conclusion that could be extracted is that ACM Digital Library's search engine needs some
extra options in order to tweak the search to better fit our search requirements. ACM provided a lot
of irrelevant results for our SLR.
We considered that this was a fairly low amount of papers in order to offer a good quality SLR for
this topic.  One possible reason for this could be an excessively restrictive research question. As
we explain in section 4.2 - What is confidentiality? - authors very often use the terms privacy and
confidentiality  as  synonyms  when  explaining  their  solutions/reviews  about  protecting  personal
information,  and although there are some differences between the two words,  this line seems
pretty blurry in the literature.
Therefore,  it's  highly  probable  that  if  we  would  have  held  on  the  search  expression  “cloud
computing” and “security” and (“privacy” or “confidentiality”) we would have got more good quality
papers after applying EC1, EC2 and EC3, as the amount of papers provided by that search was
2,021 as stated in section 3.1.2.3. However, due to time restrictions and practical reasons for this
Master Thesis, we will leave this possible continuation or “branching” of this master thesis to future
researchers interested in reviewing this topic (see section 6.2 – Future work).
So we had to choose between relaxing the exclusion criteria and include more papers, or apply a
snowballing process, selecting the references of the chosen papers. Commonly researchers who
write on these sources already did their personal selection of good quality papers, so we are going
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to take advantage from this and perform the last option, apply a snowballing process to gather and
ensure good quality results.
3.1.2.5. Selected publications by references (snowballing)
Some of the selected papers contain references to other papers which can provide added value to
the SLR. These papers have been included for the review as well.
We  performed the following Exclusion criteria  over the set  of  documents composed by all  the
references from the selected papers:
 Selection by title (S-EC1): Discarded those papers that do not fulfil  the original search
expression “cloud computing” AND security AND (“privacy” OR “confidentiality”) on the title.
As stated in the end of section 3.1.2.4, “cloud computing” AND security AND “privacy” AND
“confidentiality” is a too restrictive expression, so we decided to go back to the original
search expression and not use the one we are using for the initial search, because none of
the papers in the references matched that expression. Afterwards, we also discarded those
whose title points to a conference's workshop, or to a very specific and limited domain of
application  (like  Healthcare,  Banking...),  or  don't  make  any  reference  to  the  cloud
computing  paradigm,  or  don't refer  to  either  privacy  or  confidentiality  or  specifically  to
security.
However, these conditions were still  too restrictive.  The search domain on the references is way
smaller than the search domain on IEEExplore, ACM DL and Springerlink databases, so using a
more unrestrained search expression is more practical and feasible. Hence, we decided to “soften”
the restrictions and apply the following exclusion criteria:
 Selection by title  (S-EC1-2):  Discarded those papers  that  do not  fulfil  the  expression
“cloud” AND (security OR privacy OR confidentiality OR law*) on the title.  Afterwards, we
also discarded those  whose title points to a conference's workshop, or to a very specific
and  limited  domain  of  application  (like  Healthcare,  Banking...),  or  it  doesn't  make  any
reference  to  the  cloud  computing  paradigm,  or  it  doesn't  refer  to  either  privacy  or
confidentiality or specifically to security.
 Selection by availability (S-EC2): Only those documents which are available for free were
selected.
 Selection by source (S-EC3): Those papers which appear in the databases we use (ACM,
IEEExplore, Springerlink) are discarded. We do this because if we select them, we should
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have acquired them in our first search.
 Selection  by  abstract  and  conclusions (S-EC4): Selected  all  those  papers  whose
abstract and conclusions fulfil the following requirements:
◦ Makes a reference to cloud computing.
◦ Mentions either privacy or confidentiality as the focus of the paper, or at least providing
a state-of-the-art about general security aspects.
◦ It's not too technical focused nor too much specific to a certain domain (healthcare,
banking...).
◦ Mentions some relevant research direction on security, privacy or confidentiality.
◦ The conclusions provide an overall idea about what it should have been read in the
work.
 Selection by full-text (S-EC5): papers whose text does not aim to provide an explanation
to security nor privacy, or are too technical focused or not specific to cloud computing were
discarded.
Figure 3-3 outlines the steps performed for selecting the papers from the references. As it can be
noted, almost every document was available for free. In the end, 6   documents  have been finally
selected for our SLR in the snowballing process.
Figure 3-3: The selection process of the snowballing step
However, it  can be seen that almost 50% (16 papers) of the papers were discarded in S-EC3
because they appeared on our initial  search engines. That is a pretty high amount of  papers,
considering that we tweaked a bit the expression search for selecting the papers from references.
We are aware that we could have modified the initial search expression “cloud” AND (security
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OR privacy OR confidentiality OR law*) to keep coherence between the selection method used
in the initial search and the selection method used in the snowballing process. But as it can be
seen in section 3.1.2.4,  (Cloud computing) AND (confidentiality OR privacy) provided a high
amount  of  results,  and  is  an  expression  contained  in  “cloud”  AND  (security  OR  privacy  OR
confidentiality OR law*) which, logically, would induce to an even greater amount of results.
Therefore, we will include the discarded publications in S-EC3 and Apply S-EC4 and S-EC5 over
them (It's obvious that all those papers passed S-EC1 and S-EC2 as they were selected by title in
the snowballing process).
16 publications from the references were discarded on the snowballing process at  S-EC3.  We
applied  the  exclusion  criteria  in  section  3.1.2.4  to  them.  After  applying  S-EC4 (selection  by
abstracts  and conclusions), 7 papers were selected. Finally, after applying  S-EC5 (selection by
full-text), 6 papers have been chosen for our SLR from the pile discarded in S-EC3, which makes
up for  a total of  1  2   publications  obtained via the references  added to our SLR. Figure 3-4
complements figure 3-3 with this last addition.
Figure 3-4: The final  selection process of the snowballing
3.1.2.6. Total publications selected
Figure 3-5 outlines the overall paper selection process in this Master Thesis. From our search in 
the databases, we selected 15 publications; from the references of those publications, we selected 
12 publications, which makes up for a total of 27 publications that will compose our Systematic 
Literature Review. Table 3-7 presents the selected literature grouped by its source.
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Source Works
IEEExplore [SLR5],  [SLR6],  [SLR7],  [SLR8],  [SLR9],  [SLR10],  [SLR11],  [SLR12].,
[SLR13], [SLR27]
ACM DL [SLR3], [SLR21], [SLR23], [SLR24], [SLR25]
Springerlink [SLR1], [SLR2], [SLR4], [SLR14], [SLR15], [SLR22]
Other sources [SLR16], [SLR17], [SLR18], [SLR19], [SLR20], [SLR26]
Table 3-7: Selected works grouped by their source
Figure 3-5: The complete selection process of works for the SLR
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3.1.2.7. Classification of selected papers
This section will illustrate the classification we have done for the 27 selected publications included
in our SLR. The point of classifying the papers is being able to retrieve them quickly later on the
SLR. The categorization we followed after reading those papers, We have classified them in four
categories as follows:
1) Reviews: the content in this category are documents which contain reviews about privacy
or confidentiality issues, discussion and general aspects about the topic.
2) Proposals and solutions:  The content  in  this  category  are documents which propose
solutions, suggestions or guidelines to solve issues regarding privacy and confidentiality in
cloud computing.
Also we did a sub-categorization of papers depending on their “degree of interest” for our SLR:
1) Least interesting  (LI): the content of the papers and publications from this category are
not very suited for this review or contain a small reference to the topic, but at some point
they may deserve a mention.
2) Interesting  (I):  the  publications  from this  category  have useful  content  for  this  master
thesis.
3) Very interesting (VI): the publications from this category deserve special attention as their
content may be either broad or their quality is high enough.
Check table  3-9 in section 3.2 for a summary of this classification and how we classified each
work.
3.2. Quality assessment of the systematic review
This section contains an analysis of the obtained and selected works in order to illustrate that the
publications  selected  for  this  review  are  significant.  The  process  consists  in  posing  several
questions which will allow us to assess the quality of works.
Table  3-8 contains the quality assessment filters for  the primary studies which will  be used to
assess the quality of each paper. These filters are based on the exclusion criteria 3 (EC3) we used
to select the papers. Also, we are considering too the number of citations papers have received.
The number of citations may be an indicator if a paper has a good quality, but not in the inverse
order. This is, a high number of citations is an indicator of a good paper, but a low number of
citations  paper  does not  mean it  is  not  a good quality  paper.  They may be too recent  to  be
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evaluated,  or  they just  touch a very specific  area,  reducing the overall  focus.  Although Cloud
Computing has been in the scene for some time, it is still under heavy research focus.
Quality assessment form
QA1 Is there a clear and understandable statement of the objective of the 
research?
QA2 Does the paper introduces the concepts and a background of the problem?
QA3 Does the paper include examples of application, case studies or a 
motivating example?
QA4 Are the conclusions credible and justified?
QA5 Does the study provide value for research and further work?
QA6 Does the paper include a related work section?
QA7 In case of a pure review, does the paper use a Systematic and replicable 
approach to present results?
Table 3-8: Questions to asses the quality of selected works
The rational of each questions is the following:
1) QA1 – The work should clearly define and introduce the aim of the work and what it  is
expected by reading it.
2) QA2 –  Providing  background  information  and  concepts  helps  to  understand  the
problem/solution the are trying to review/propose
3) QA3 – Including examples helps to illustrate the field of application of a solution or visualize
an issue in a real case scenario.
4) QA4 –  Conclusions  which  clearly  synthesize  the  content  of  the  work  help  in  quickly
assessing if the paper fits our interests.
5) QA5 – A work which poses future work or research directions is useful in order to identify
research gaps.
6) QA6 – Providing a related work section allows readers to get more insight on the matter
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and get new points to gather more literature on the topic they are interested, and provide
more credibility to the authors' work as it illustrates that there are more researchers who are
involved in reaching their same goal.
7) QA7 –  Using a systematic approach to present review results enables the capability to
reproduce their results, which adds credibility to the work and allows the expansion of the
work to a more recent date.
It  is  to  be noted that  these questions  are not  applicable  to every work,  and not  every posed
question is critical. QA1 and QA4 are important because they helped us in selecting papers when
applying the exclusion criteria 2 (EC2). QA2 has proven to be common in almost very work we
have going through, so it did not contribute very much in assessing the quality of the work. QA3 on
the other side helps in making a difference among works, but in purely based review works they
are not a mandatory as in works who propose practical solutions. This same rationale applies to
QA6 for pure review papers, as they usually intend to point research directions (QA5). Finally, QA7
is a hard-to-assess question as sometimes conference papers have to limit the number of their
pages,  so  there  is  no  space  to  explain  research  methodology  or  information  gathering
methodology. Also, for papers focused in offering solutions to issues usually there is no systematic
review approach. So, for QA7 we put in Table 3-9 a hyphen (-) whenever the methodology used is
unknown or not defined, a check ( ) whenever a systematic approach has been used by authors,✔
or  a cross ( )  whenever  a  review has been posed,  but  the results  have not  been related to✖
references at any time.
The answer to these questions helped us as well to classify the papers under a Degree of Interest
(D.I., see section 3.1.2.7.).  Table 3-9 represents the quality assessment, classifying all papers to
the  specific  topic  it  belongs,  the  year  of  its  publication,  the  number  of  citations,  the  quality
assessment evaluation and the total amount of publications per topic.  Each  one  of the criteria
filters on table 3-8 have been graded with a dichotomous “Yes” or “No” scale whether the papers
covered them or not. Some papers which provide solutions to certain issues also provide a review
to introduce the topic.
In general and according to our assessment, the gathered works provide enough quality to give
significant value to our review.  It can be noted that in most cases a greater number of citations
matches with a higher degree of interest from our point of view. Those works whose citations were
not  available  (NA)  were  works  gathered  from heterogeneous  sources  (works  which  were  not
obtained from our selected databases).
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Ref. Cites Review
Proposals
or 
solutions
D.I. QA1 QA2 QA3 QA4 QA5 QA6 QA7
[SLR1] 10 ✔ LI ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖
[SLR2] 7 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR3] 21 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
[SLR4] 21 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR5] 4 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR6] 85 ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR7] 43 ✔ LI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR8] 21 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR9] 2 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR10] 95 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR11] 6 ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
[SLR12] 1 ✔ LI ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
[SLR13] 12 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR14] 95 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR15] 2 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR16] 301 ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR17] NA ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖
[SLR18] NA ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR19] NA ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR20] NA ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖
[SLR21] 21 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
[SLR22] NA ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR23] 7 ✔ ✔ VI ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR24] 5 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR25] 17 ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ -
[SLR26] NA ✔ ✔ LI ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ -
[SLR27] 25 ✔ ✔ I ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
Table 3-9: Summary of the attributes of the selected works
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
IN CLOUD COMPUTING
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW RESULTS ANALYSIS
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Chapter 4: Privacy and confidentiality issues and challenges in
Cloud Computing: Systematic Review results analysis
This chapter is the main contribution of this Master Thesis. In it, we will synthesize and describe all
the evidence found and collected from the 27 selected papers in the  literature  regarding privacy
and confidentiality, identify issues and challenges and any found solution to those issues, as well
as trying to establish a relationship among the found literature in order to find any possible gap or
open the door to possible relationships. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
1) Section  4.1  will  introduce  and  explain  what  is  privacy  and the found  definitions  in  the
literature. 
2) Section 4.2 will  introduce and  explain what is confidentiality and what differences it from
privacy. 
3) Finally,  section  4.3  will  expose  all  the  issues  and  challenges  related  to  privacy  and
confidentiality in cloud computing in a categorized way, listing any remarkable evidence
found as well as proposed solutions and suggestions from the different authors. 
4.1. What is Privacy?
Privacy is a wide concept that varies among countries, cultures and jurisdictions. Giving a precise
definition is difficult if  not impossible,  and this matter, by itself,  poses a problem when trying to
establish a consensus.
In the literature, we have found  4 relevant documents  related to the definitions about privacy in
cloud computing and general information about it: [SLR16], [SLR12], [SLR23] and [SLR27].
Both Mather et al. [SLR16] and X. Ma [SLR12] perform general reviews about privacy concerns in
cloud computing (being [SLR16] the one which provides more insight). Pearson and Charlesworth
[SLR23] also review some privacy issues (focusing on accountability as a solution, which will be
reviewed later in section 4.3.2.1.5 - Audit, monitoring and accountability). They expose background
information about the topic and several related concerns which will be discussed and classified
through this Systematic review. 
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Below we list several definitions for privacy which have been identified in the literature
 The definition adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD):  “It  is  the  status  accorded to  data  which has been agreed upon between the
person or  organization  furnishing the data  and the organization  receiving it  and which
describes the degree of protection which will be provided” [SLR16]
 The definition  provided in  the Generally  Accepted Privacy  Principles  (GAPP) standard:
“The rights and obligations of individuals and organizations with respect to the collection,
use, retention, and disclosure of personal information.” [SLR16][SLR27]
 The definition provided by Oxford Dictionary: “privacy is defined as “a state in which one is
not observed or disturbed by other people” and “a state of being free from public attention.”
More specifically, privacy rights or obligations are related to the collection, use, disclosure,
storage, and destruction of personal data or personally identifiable information.” [SLR12]
 Privacy is a fundamental human right that encompasses the right to be left alone [...]. In the
commercial, consumer context, privacy entails the protection and appropriate use of the
personal information of customers, and the meeting of expectations of customers about its
use.  For  organisations,  privacy  entails  the  application  of  laws,  policies,  standards  and
processes by which Personally Identifiable Information of individuals is managed [SLR23].
Some differences can be noted in the definitions. While OECD defines privacy as a direct link
between an individual and its related data, GAPP, Oxford Dictionary  and [SLR23]  go one step
further, including to the definition the right management of that information.  Given the concerns
arisen on privacy, a deep and complex definition of Privacy is necessary to correctly define it, but
the general idea is that privacy is related to the collection, use, disclosure, storage and destruction
of personal data.
Also, different legislations rise different definitions and conceptions of privacy. According to Mather
et al. [SLR16] in EU privacy is a basic right, whereas in U.S. it is more centred on avoiding harm.
However, the broad principles and definitions described above would apply to most countries.
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Privacy is a key business risk and compliance issue and it is, basically, what keep customers away
or worried about the cloud. Pearson and Charlesworth [SLR23] suggest that, in order to conform to
legal  privacy  requirements  regarding  personal  information  in  the  cloud,  corporations  need  to
demonstrate an appropriate level  of  control  over  the data at  all  stages of  its processing,  from
collection to destruction.
As a background information on privacy  and related to the collection  and destruction  of  data
mentioned by [SLR23], X. Ma, Mather et al.  and Chen et al.  [SLR12][SLR16][SLR27]  define this
process as “the Data Life Cycle”. Figure 4-1 illustrates this process with its phases.
Figure 4-1: The data life-cycle
Table 4-1 describes each one of this phases and which are its main responsibilities.
According  to  Ma  [SLR12],  due  to  poor  management  or  malicious  employees  of  the  service
providers, data may be leaked to third parties. Such leakage might happen at any stage of the data
life cycle. Therefore it is important to investigate what happens with the data in each stage of data
life cycle, even if this investigation may raise some issues as explained later in section 4.3.2.1.5.
Besides acknowledging the data life-cycle process, its also necessary to acknowledge what kind of
information needs to be  managed and  protected. On its paper, S. Pearson [SLR17] makes an
analysis over several privacy issues and challenges and describes three types of privacy sensitive
information:
 Personally identifiable information (PII): any information that identifies an individual (name,
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address, IP address, credit card number, biometric information...)
 Sensitive information: information on religion, race, health, financial information... any type
which is considered private.
 Usage data: usage data collected from the use of computer devices or actions performed
(use a printer, visit a web page, etc...)
Phase Description: This phase deals with...
Generation of 
the information
- Who owns the data
- How this ownership is maintained
- How and when personal information is classified
- Defines the governance structure that manages and protects this data 
through the cycle.
Use - How and where personal information is used
- If information is shared with third parties (i.e. CSP subcontractors)
- If the information is used with the purpose it was collected
- If information enables organization to comply legal requirements.
Transfer - How information is transferred to the cloud (transport protocols)
- If information is protected appropriately
- If the transfer required encryption
- If there are appropriate access controls
Transforming 
and sharing
- What happens when personal information is transformed and shared in 
the cloud.
- If transformed and shared data maintains original protections and 
restrictions
- If integrity is maintained
- Isolation of sensitive information from original data
Storage - How is data stored
- If there are appropriate controls over personal information
- How is integrity, availability and confidentiality maintained
- If the CSP supports encryption and key management
Archival - What happens with data already stored in the cloud
- In which media is this data stored and who controls it
- How long should data be retained
Destruction - The removal of data from the cloud and make sure if the data is destroyed 
in a secure manner or can be recovered somehow
Table 4-1: Data life-cycle phases with descriptions
Finally, Pearson summarizes several key requirements privacy should fulfil in order to keep data
protected. Table 4-2 shows these requirements and their descriptions.
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The  non-fulfilment  of  these  requirements  is,  in  fact,  what  “unleashes”  the  issues  that  will  be
reviewed in this Master Thesis in Section 4.3. 
Requirement Description
Notice, openness 
and transparency
- Users must be notified about:
• Which data is being collected
• How they want to use it
• How long they will keep it
• With whom will this data be shared
• Any other use
- Privacy policies must be made available
- Personal information should be collected directly from the person unless 
there is a good reason to not do so.
Choice, consent 
and control
- Users should decide whether they want personal information to be 
collected/disclosed or not.
Scope / 
minimisation
- Only information that is required to fulfil the stated purpose should be 
collected or shared
Access and 
accuracy
- Users must be able to 
• Get access to their personal information 
• Check the accuracy of data
Security 
safeguards
- Safeguards must prevent unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or 
modification of personal information
Compliance - Transactions must be compliant to privacy legislation
Purpose - Data usage has to be limited to the purpose for which it was collected. 
- There must be a clearly specified purpose for the collection and sharing of 
personal information.
Limiting use, 
disclosure and 
retention
- Data can only be disclosed to those parties authorized to receive it
- Data should only be kept as long as it is necessary.
Accountability - An organization must appoint someone to ensure that privacy policies and 
practices are followed. 
- Audit functions must be present to monitor all data accesses and 
modifications.
Table 4-2: Privacy requirements and descriptions
In chapter 5, as an additional contribution to this Master Thesis, we will propose a binding for the
described data life-cycle phases and privacy requirements to the identified issues in section 4.3.
This way we want to try establishing a direct connection between phases, requirements and issues
which may serve to direct future research areas.
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4.2. What is confidentiality?
Confidentiality is a rather blurry term in the literature and it doesn't seem very clear in the research
community  which are  the key differences between privacy and confidentiality. Very often authors
refer to privacy as a global concept when they propose their solutions or perform their reviews
whilst, according to the definitions of confidentiality provided  below, they could use this term as
well.  
In the literature, 3 papers make a definition over the term confidentiality:  [SLR9],  [SLR10] and
[SLR11]. 
Some definitions about confidentiality that have been found in the gathered evidence are: 
 “The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized 
individuals, entities, or process.” [SLR9], definition given by ISO/IEC 2700
 “Keeping users’ data secret in the Cloud systems” [SLR10].
 “Confidentiality implies that customer’s data and computation tasks are to be kept 
confidential from both the cloud provider and other customers.” [SLR11].
These definitions enter in contrast with the ones provided in the previous section about privacy. For
example, in [SLR12] X. Ma defined privacy as “a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by
other people”  and “a state of being free from public attention. More specifically, privacy rights or
obligations are related to the collection, use, disclosure, storage, and destruction of personal data
or  personally  identifiable  information.”.  As  it  can  be  noted,  confidentiality  is  illustrated  more
specifically related to the domain of “keeping data secret and unavailable” whilst privacy is a more
global concept, which entangles rights, obligations and management over this data. 
Summarizing the evidence in a single definition, we could say that confidentiality is a characteristic
of privacy which focuses on protecting information leakage by establishing measures to prevent
the unwanted disclosure of data. Confidentiality, as we will see through section 4.3, is commonly
achieved through securing technology with techniques like encryption, access management and
virtualization robustness.
In fact, in their review paper about security in Cloud Computing, Xiao et al. [SLR11] explain that
confidentiality is an attribute of privacy (saying, therefore and as explained previously, that privacy
is  the  global  concept  which  involves  data  protection,  legislation,  and  management  while
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confidentiality  is  more  specific  to  the  protection  and  harm-prevention  of  data),  and  regards
privacy-preservability  as  the  core  attribute  of  privacy,  among  confidentiality,  integrity  and
accountability.   What's more, the authors consider  that  privacy-preservability is a stricter form of
confidentiality, due to the notion that they both prevent information leakage. If cloud confidentiality
is ever violated, privacy-preservability will also be violated. This could be one of the reasons why
confidentiality is a term which appears less often in the literature, as most solution that deal with
data protection and safety satisfy confidentiality and protects privacy.
4.3. Privacy and Confidentiality concerns, issues and challenges
Whenever an individual  customer, a business, a government agency, or  another entity  uploads
data to the cloud, privacy and confidentiality questions may arise [SLR21]. Users expect that cloud
providers will protect their data from unauthorized access, and sensitive data will remain private.
They also expect that any third parties like governments will not monitor their activity. Even if a
Cloud  Service  Provider takes all  the necessary steps to protect this data like using encrypting
algorithms, are such efforts sufficient?
Several authors in the literature emphasize in the matter that the security and privacy mechanisms
provided by  cloud  companies are not adequate and  result in a big obstacle for users to adopt
Cloud  Computing  technologies  [SLR10].  Cloud  computing  is  capable  of  handling  mass  data
storage and  intense  computing tasks,  so  traditional  security  mechanisms  which  sufficed on  a
Desktop environment (e.g. anti-virus, firewalls, etc.) may not be enough in the cloud due to heavy
computation or communication overhead [SLR11]. In addition, privacy threats differ depending on
the scenario (privacy requirements are different on a banking case than on a mail service, for
instance) [SLR17]. 
This section is the backbone of this systematic literature review. In it we will summarize all the
evidence  found  in  the  literature  about  different  issues  and  challenges  regarding  privacy  and
confidentiality in Cloud Computing, and research directions/solutions/suggestions authors outline
to tackle these problems.  More specifically, we provide a classification of privacy issues and the
approaches found in the literature to address them or, if no approaches or solutions have been
found,  mention any  posed questions  found in the literature  to step forward for research in the
specific topic/issue. 
The literature on this topic is fairly spread and every author mentions several and different issues,
some of them which may be connected with each other.  For the sake of ease the tracing of this
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document  and  clarify  the  relationships  between  works,  table  4-4 lists  the  categorization  we
performed over the concerns about privacy and confidentiality found in the literature.  It displays
which works have been found for every category, which are the identified issues for each category,
and if the issues found relate to privacy (general issues over management and rights over data),
confidentiality (measures to prevent data leakage) or both. 
Each subsection which contains identified privacy and confidentiality concerns is attached with a
figure similar to Figure 4-2 and a table similar to table 4-3. The goal for doing this is to provide and
give a quick visual understanding for each identified concern. 
Figure  4-2 represents  a  template  to  display the  interactions  of  different  cloud  actors,  (most
commonly Cloud customer and the Cloud provider, refer to section 2.2 to see the list of Cloud
actors)  and the questions that  they may rise on the usage of  the cloud,  which,  alongside the
requirements described in section 4.1, arise the concerns that have been identified. Cloud actors
may direct their questions at other actors or themselves (self-questions).
Table 4-3 represents a template to expose which are the identified issues for each category and its
respective solutions, alongside a reference to the work that proposed that solution. The works that
can be found in these tables are the ones which provide proposals or solutions as noted in the
table 3-9 in section 3.2.
Figure 4-2: Meta-figure which represents the question Cloud actors raise
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Issue 1 - Proposed solution 1 [#work]
Issue 2 - Proposed solution 1 [#work]- Proposed solution 2 [#work]
Issue 3 - Proposed solution 1 [#work]
Table 4-3: Meta-table which exposes the issues and challenges found alongside works and their solutions
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Table 4-4: Summary of Privacy and Confidentiality categorization, works and solutions
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Table 4-4 (bis): Summary of Privacy and Confidentiality categorization, works and solutions
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4.3.1. Virtualization
Virtualization  refers  to  the  abstraction  of  computer  resources  and it  is  a  key  feature of  cloud
computing  [SLR13]  (see  Section  2.5.1 –  Technological  components).  Virtualization  technology
allows dynamic resource allocation and service provisioning, and allows multiple OSs co-reside on
the same physical machine without interfering each other. Many virtualization technologies have
been proposed and implemented, such as Xen, VMware.
In the literature, 6 papers have been found about issues or mentions regarding virtualization and
data privacy: [SLR8], [SLR11], [SLR13], [SLR19], [SLR20] and [SLR23]. [SLR8], [SLR11], [SLR13]
and  [SLR19]  provide  actual  solutions  to  the concerns  that  will  be  enumerated  and  described
through this  section.  [SLR20]  and [SLR23]  provide reviews that  complement  explanations  and
helped identifying and assessing these concerns.  Figure 4-3 symbolizes the questions that  the
main  Cloud actors arise on the matter,  and table  4-5 summarizes the  found  issues and  their
proposed solutions about virtualization in the literature. 
Figure 4-3: Questions raised by actors about Virtualization
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Cross-VM attack
- Placement prevention [SLR11]
- Co-residency detection [SLR11]
- NoHype [SLR11]
Malicious SysAdmin
- Trusted Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP) [SLR8,SLR11, 
SLR13]
- Combine TCCP with a custom guest VM [SLR13]
VM hopping - Cover hypervisor security holes [SLR19]
Table 4-5: Summary of identified issues related to virtualization 
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There  are  security  risks  in  sharing  machines.  Basically,  and  according  to  Pearson  and
Charlesworth  [SLR23] and  Xiao et al. [SLR11]  virtualization  arises the problem of  losing control
over data location, who has access to it, and multi-tenancy which, although provides lot of benefits,
also arises security issues which may be exploited. NIST [SLR20] adds to the matter that attackers
can easily focus their attacks on a single machine to affect multiple victims due to the hypervisor
(according to the definition of NIST, the hypervisor is a layer of software between an operating
system and hardware platform that is used to operate Virtual Machines like launch or terminating).
Hypervisor adds APIs (Application programming interfaces), channels (sockets) and data inputs
(like strings) which increase the  complexity  of a system and increases the surface attack.  This
point of view seems to not be shared by the ENISA report [SLR19], which say that attacks on
hypervisors are less numerous and more difficult to put in practice for an attacker compared to
attacks to traditional OS.
Xiao et al. [SLR11] focus on a couple of issues regarding virtualization:  Cross-VM attack (which
may be performed by other tenants in the cloud)  and Malicious SysAdmin (which may only be
performed  by  an  inside  attack  from  cloud  vendor).  In  the  ENISA report  [SLR19],  one more
vulnerability is described: VM hopping.
Cross-VM  attack is  a vulnerability  that  allows  a malicious adversary steal  information without
leaving a trail or raising alarms. To do this, a malicious VM is placed on the physical server where
the target client’s VM is located. To achieve this, an adversary should first determine where the
target VM instance is located (this can be done with network probing tools such as nmap, hping,
wget,  etc.);  then, the adversary should be able to determine if  there are two VM instances by
comparing IP addresses to see if they match, and measuring the small packet round-trip time.
CSPs like Amazon EC2 launch new instances of VMs on the same set of physical machines, so
there is a good chance that the malicious user is placed on the same physical server, and once the
malicious VM has been created alongside the victim VM in the same physical machine, both share
certain  physical  resources  like  data  cache,  network  access,  CPU  pipelines,  etc...  which  the
adversary can employ to attack the VM: measure cache usage to estimate current load of server,
estimate traffic rate, keystroke timing that can steal victim's password... 
To address this, Xiao et al. [SLR11] propose the following defence strategies against cross-VM:
 Placement prevention:  consists in obfuscating co-residence in Virtual Machines by having
Dom0  (Dom0 or  Domain0  is  the  superior  layer  that  manages  the  hardware  of  Virtual
Machines) not respond in traceroute (a diagnostic tool for displaying the route that network
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packets follow), or by randomly assigning internal IP addresses to launched VMs. 
 Co-residency Detection:  this approach  completely eliminates co-residency.  However this
goes against the economical benefits and cost-savings of virtualization, so left options are
sharing infrastructure with trustworthy customers or VMs owned by the same customer. 
 NoHype:  NoHype attempts to minimize the degree of shared infrastructure by removing the
hypervisor while still retaining the key features of virtualization.  This eliminates L1 cache
side channel (which may be used for attacks  as L1 caches contain potential  damaging
side-channels,  refer  to  [44]  for  more  information)  and  retain  multi-tenancy  properties.
However  NoHype  requires  changing  hardware,  making  it  less  practical.  Removing  the
hypervisor  may also deal  with the issues  previously  explained by NIST [SLR20]  which
relate to the hypervisor, as compromising the hypervisor also compromises all the systems
that it hosts.
Malicious SysAdmin is a vulnerability in which a privileged administrator of the cloud provider can
perform attacks by accessing the memory of a customer’s VMs. For instance, Xenaccess enables
an administrator to directly access the VM memory at run time by running a user level process in
Domain0. As cloud use increases, chance of malicious activities by cloud provider employees can
heavily impact confidentiality,  availability and integrity of all  data. This is specially important as
Cloud Computing architectures need some roles which are very high-risk.
To address this issue,  Sengupta et al.  [SLR8], Xiao et al.  [SLR11] And J. Kong [SLR13] propose
the use of  Trusted Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP) to achieve data confidentiality for guest
virtual machines. TCCP is a set of technologies developed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
to face  the concern of untrusted execution environment.  TCCP guarantees that the  execution of
virtual machines  doesn't  leak any information and keeps data confidential.  TCCP does this  by
closing the VM execution inside a secure perimeter  and making the CSP administrator with root
privileges unable to access the memory of a  hosted VM.  TCCP are usually based on a  Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), which is integrated on the motherboards, and includes some technologies
such as Remote attestation, sealed storage and authenticated booting.
Regarding confidentiality preservation and TCCP,  J.  Kong  [SLR13] proposes an architecture  to
combine machine virtualization technology with TCCP to achieve a greater degree of confidentiality
on virtual  machines.  This  architecture consists in customizing the guest  VM operating system,
disabling all the unnecessary virtual devices, and disallowing code from the CSP to be executed in
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the guest VM.  By doing this, clients’ data confidentiality  is  greatly enhanced against the service
provider, as only valid users are able to boot the target VM. Kong explains this architecture in its
paper, which consists of three differentiated parts as it can be seen in figure 4-4: Part #1 contains
the trusted part (which includes hardware platform and a trusted Xen hypervisor), part #2 contains
the untrusted part (parts controlled by the CSP), and part #3 contains the protected part (which
includes the guest VM environment). 
Figure 4-4. Overview of J. Kong proposed the architecture to achieve confidentiality on VMs
VM hopping is a vulnerability in which an attacker hacks a Virtual Machine using some method
like the ones described above and then, by exploiting any hypervisor vulnerability, takes the control
of other VMs which are under the management of the same hypervisor. However, according to
ENISA [SLR19], this kind of vulnerability relies on the supposition that the hypervisor has a security
hole. On a robust hypervisor this kind of attacks should not happen.
4.3.2. Data location
When  information  crosses  borders  (whether  they  are  international  borders  or  company's
boundaries), privacy issues arise a variety of concerns. Usually, customers do not know where the
data is [SLR27], and constraints on the flow of personal and sensitive data, as well as constraints
in  the requirements on the protection  of data, have become the subject of national and regional
privacy and security laws and regulations.
Data location is  one of the most common compliance issues an organization  faces with its data
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and has a significant impact on privacy and confidentiality protections  [SLR16][SLR18].  In Cloud
Computing, data may be stored redundantly in multiple physical locations and detailed information
about the location of the data may be unavailable to the service consumer. This situation makes it
difficult to  predict whether legal and compliance requirements are being met,  as different privacy
laws  in  various  countries  limit  the  ability  of  organizations  to  transfer  some types  of  personal
information. 
In  the  literature,  data  location  issues  are  classified in  three ways.  Pearson  and Charlesworth
[SLR23] divide data location issues into two categories, outsourcing and offshoring, whilst Zhou et
al.  [SLR10]  add one more category,  data combination and commingling.  Next  subsections will
review these 3 categories.
4.3.2.1. Data Outsourcing
Data outsourcing  refers to the fact  that  data crosses company's  boundaries and is  hosted on
another company (the CSP). This also means that customers physically lose control on their data,
and this loss of control  is one of the main causes of cloud insecurity and raises governance and
accountability questions [SLR11][SLR12][SLR16][SLR17][SLR23]. 
Data Outsourcing is one of the issues that arise more concerns about privacy in Cloud Computing.
As condensing all the issues related to Data Outsourcing in one section would be rather long, we
decided to split them into subsections which will allow us to present them in a more organized way.
4.3.2.1.1. Data Outsourcing: General issues
This section will review general issues found in the literature which regard to the outsource of data.
In the  gathered evidence,  there are  6 papers which deal  with issues regarding data location,
[SLR17], [SLR19], [SLR20],  [SLR21],  [SLR23] and [SLR26].  These papers, alongside reviews on
data  outsourcing,  provide  actual  solutions  to  some  identified  issues  for  this  area.  Figure  4-5
symbolizes the questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-6 summarizes
the issues found and solutions proposed about general issue on data outsourcing in the literature.
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Figure 4-5: Questions raised by actors about general issues on data outsourcing
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Security: Cloud Computing vs 
traditional computing
- Cloud Computing is more secure than traditional PC due to 
CSP expertise in security [SLR23]
- Levels of privacy and anonymity will be lower [SLR26]
How to build up trust and 
confidence in customers
- Organisations should follow risk assessment frameworks 
and practices like Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [SLR20]
- Standard organisations should develop cloud certifications 
and privacy templates [SLR17, SLR19, SLR21]
- Cloud Service Providers should follow sets of best 
practices like the use of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
and techniques like obfuscation and maximise user control 
[SLR17, SLR19]
Table 4-6: Summary of identified issues related to general issues of Data Outsourcing
On a traditional PC or servers owned by a company there is control over how the data is stored
and there are controlled restrictions on who can access it. For cloud computing, the data is stored
on the server and the third-party company is responsible for deciding the details of data storage.
Due to the fact that sensitive data is out of the owners’ control, outsourcing will potentially incur
privacy violations. 
Nevertheless, and according to  Roberts et al.  [SLR1],  Pearson and Charlesworth [SLR23]  and
ENISA [SLR19], outsourcing the data to the  Cloud  may (arguably) be even a safer option than
storing it on a traditional PC. The Cloud Provider is usually comprised by experts responsible of
maintaining the security of information, whilst most individuals do not have the expertise nor will to
implement bleeding edge security features on their home PCs.  This fact leads to the conclusion
that storing data on the cloud may be actually safer than storing it indoors. However this point of
view is not shared by Jaeger et al. [SLR26] who state that the levels of privacy and anonymity for a
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cloud user will be lower than a desktop user. Some consensus on this topic is required as future
research. 
In  order  to  provide  more confidence to  customers  when  outsourcing  data  to  the  cloud,  NIST
Guidelines [SLR20] provides information and proposes a framework outlining which activities and
steps an organisation should follow in order to ensure that the outsourcing of data is done in a
secure  way  and  in  compliance  with  all  organisational  policies  while  maintaining  privacy.   The
recommended steps to  follow are:  requirements  specification  (personnel  requirements,  access
controls...),  security  and  privacy  risks  assessment,  and  assess  the  competency  of  the  Cloud
Provider (experience, quality, track records...). 
Similar to the NIST guidelines, in the ENISA report [SLR19] and the paper of S. Pearson [SLR17],
the authors do some recommendations and  provide a set  of  practices to build  up trust  which
include: 
 The definition of standard certifications and creation of Cloud computing security life-cycle
standards. According to Subashini and Kavitha [SLR21], the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
is an organization focused on developing standards and security solutions for the cloud.
 The  definition  and  creation  of  privacy  templates  and  patterns  to  fit  several  kinds  of
scenarios and help engineers, and the application of the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
which aims to help organizations  assess the impact  of  operations on personal  privacy,
define  the  privacy  requirements  and  identify  problems  related  to  proposed  privacy
solutions.
 Use Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET) like secure online access mechanisms, privacy
management tools which allow server-side inspection of policies, and pseudonymisations
tools to hide true identity.
 Minimise  personal  information  sent  and  stored  in  the  cloud  and  apply  anonymisation
techniques like obfuscation.
 Protect personal information in the cloud  with tamper-resistant hardware during transfer
and storage of data and protect information with access controls.
 Maximise user control  to increase trust and confidence in the cloud. Approaches that can
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be used are the definition of personal information management preferences.
 Specify and limit data usage to the purpose it was collected. Mechanisms like Digital Rights
Management (DRM) techniques can be used to achieve this.
 Provide feedback and design human interfaces to inform users about privacy functionality.
4.3.2.1.2. Lack of execution controls, customers' privacy requirements and policies
Customers do need different degrees of privacy on its data. For example, Healthcare businesses
do need specific necessities whilst a SME (Small or Medium Enterprise) or a startup may need
other ones which do not require a high degree of confidentiality and protection measures. Usually
CSP offer their clients identical services with rigid Service Level Agreements (SLA), even though
their  confidentiality  requirements  deviate  from  each  other  [SLR9].  According  to  ENISA report
[SLR19],  a  poor  provider  selection  can affect  company reputation,  customer  trust  and service
delivery.  If CSP could include better policies and practices, users could be able to better assess
privacy and confidentiality risks they face [SLR18].
What's  more,  cloud  customer  does  not  have  a  complete control  over  remote  execution
environment (memory, access to external shared utilities, etc.) [SLR8] nor its data [SLR20], and it
can be difficult for the customer to check if the data processing is done in a lawful way [SLR19], so
customers  would want  to inspect the execution traces to ensure that illegal operations are not
performed on his cloud environment.
In the literature, 8 papers have been identified which provide solutions to address these issues and
suit customers' privacy requirements or make a mention about it: [SLR3], [SLR6], [SLR8], [SLR9],
[SLR18],  [SLR19],  [SLR20] and  [SLR26].  [SLR3],  [SLR6],  [SLR9]  and  [SLR18]  provide  actual
solutions to the concerns that  will  be enumerated and described through this  section.  [SLR8],
[SLR19],  [SLR20]  and  [SLR26]  provide  reviews  that  complement  explanations  and  helped
identifying and assessing these concerns. Then, figure 4-6 symbolizes the questions that the main
Cloud actors arise on the matter. Finally, table 4-7 summarizes the evidence found about the topic
of fitting customer's privacy requirements and issues related to the lack of control.
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Figure 4-6: Questions raised by actors about lack of execution controls, customers' privacy requirements and policies
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Customer's privacy 
requirements may not fit to the
conditions or policies for a 
Cloud Service
- Policy-driven frameworks to establish integrated policies 
and identify best providers [SLR3]
- ScoRiM [SLR9]
- Privacy as a Service [SLR6]
- Establish standards in cloud computing paradigm to ease 
the analysis of different CSP [SLR18]
Table 4-7: Summary of identified issues related to lack of execution controls, customers' privacy requirements and
policies
As  stated  previously,  customers deal  with  large  amounts of  cloud  service  providers,  which
overwhelms  customers as  they  have  to  manually  identify  which  of  them  meets  his  privacy
requirements  [SLR26].  Gellman  [SLR18]  suggests  to  cloud  computing  industry  to  establish
standards in the paradigm, as the current lack of them makes it difficult to users to analyse and
assess the differences between CSPs. Commonly, when a cloud service provider is chosen, the
established privacy policy between the user and the CSP may not exactly meet or are incompatible
with  user's privacy requirements.  According to NIST [SLR20],  inadequate policies may lead to
undetected intrusion and violation policies due to insufficient auditing and monitoring and loss of
privacy because the CSP handles sensitive data in a less rigorous way than organisation's.
New policy requirements could be written for all participating parties, but this can be very time
consuming as communication and negotiation efforts  are required. It  may  even become more
problematic if  users are using  multiple cloud providers  (even if  they are not aware of that,  see
section 4.3.2.1.8 for more information).
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To deal with this problem, Lin et al. [SLR3] propose a policy-driven framework which integrates
three key functions: (1) policy ranking that helps users quickly identify a suitable policy provider; (2)
automatic policy generation that takes policies and requirements from the user and the service
providers to automatically generate an integrated policy to be adopted by the participating parties;
(3) policy enforcement that enforces privacy policies across multiple parties. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates this framework with an example: a user joined the cloud and faces six cloud
service providers, each of them able to provide the service that user's needs. In order to find the
service provider whose privacy policies best  fit  user’s privacy requirements,  the user’s  privacy
requirements and policies from service providers are sent to the policy ranking module together.
The ranking module helps select  service provider S2 for  the user by  comparing the customer
requirement with the policies of multiple service providers and subsequently picking the one with
the highest rank. The second step is to send their policies to the policy integration module which
will automatically generate an integrated policy as agreed by both parties. Throughout the service,
user’s data privacy will be protected by the executable policy and the executable policy may also
travel among contractors associated with service provider S2.
Figure 4-7: An Overview of the Lin et al. Policy-driven framework
Another  solution proposed by Chou et  al.  [SLR9]  is SaaS Confidentiality Risk Management
(ScoRiM) Framework, which improves the client side confidentiality management in a public SaaS
and focuses on small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which are often confronted with rigid
contracts enforced by  CSP and  cannot negotiate Service Level Agreements (SLAs).  Figure  4-8
presents and outline of this framework. 
It is not a technology solution, but rather a  handful set of steps that businesses should follow to
achieve a fitting policy. Basically, the objective of this framework is to help customers to determine
Privacy and Confidentiality issues in Cloud Computing architectures 77
which public  SaaS provider best  suits their  confidentiality needs.  These steps are,  in  order of
execution:  Preparation Phase (definition of IT goals,  establish security policies and understand
legal  requirements),  Conception  Phase (establish  confidentiality  requirements  over  data),
Identification  Phase (identification  of  the  current  system,  potential  threats  and  vulnerabilities),
Confidentiality  Risk  Assessment (check  if  current  security  controls  fulfil  confidentiality
requirements),  Provider decision Phase (decide the most appropriate Cloud Provider),  Treatment
decision and Implementation Phase (give treatment to high risk threats and estimate time and cost)
and Management Phase (review that the designed treatments are followed)
Figure 4-8: The outline of ScoRiM Framework
Itani  et al.  [SLR6]  present  a  completely  different  approach  compared  to  the  previous  ones
presented to provide customers with a loose control over privacy:  PasS (Privacy as a Service),
which basically is a set  of  security protocols for  ensuring the privacy and legal compliance of
customer data in cloud computing architectures. PaaS is based on the idea that privacy should be
provided to cloud customers as a service with  low additional cost,  and that this privacy settings
should be configurable,  flexible,  have control over  the stored data, better protection of sensitive
data and achieving legal compliance. 
The goal of PasS  is  to maximize users’ control in managing the  several  aspects related to the
privacy of sensitive data,  and achieving  secure storage, processing, and auditing of  customers’
confidential  data  by  taking  advantage  of the  tamper-proof  capabilities  of  cryptographic
coprocessors,  which  provide a secure and trusted execution domain in the cloud protected from
unauthorized  access.  This  is  achieved  by  implementing  software  protection  and  data  privacy
categorization mechanisms. The authors mention that they implemented a prototype of the PasS
protocols  on  a  simple  banking  application.  The  prototype  included,  in  addition  to  a  sample
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implementation of the privacy protocols, an implementation of the data privacy categorization and
software division mechanisms. 
4.3.2.1.3. Data ownership
When moving to the cloud, data storage and management changes its hands. This raises issues
about who owns the data in the cloud, which must be clearly defined to avoid future litigations.
In the literature, 3 works have been identified which provide explanations about the issue of data
ownership: [SLR16], [SLR20], and [SLR27]. These three papers provide suggestions on the matter.
Figure 4-9 symbolizes the questions0 that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-8
summarizes the evidence found about the topic.
Figure 4-9: Questions raised by actors about data ownership
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Who owns the data in the 
cloud - Establish clear policies and SLAs [SLR16, SLR20, SLR27]
Table 4-8: Summary of identified issues related to data ownership
Mather et al. [SLR16] and NIST [SLR20] suggest, to deal with, that organisation's ownership over
data  has  to  be  firmly  established  in  the  service  contract  and  SLAs,  clearly  stating  that  the
organisation retains exclusive ownership over the data and that the CSP does not acquire rights
nor licenses over it. 
Chen et al. [SLR27] exemplify data ownership issues with question that clearly defines the issues
about data ownership: “If you move to a competing service provider, can you take your data with
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you? Could you lose access to documents if you fail to pay a bill?”. According to the authors, right
now there is no way to control these issues besides assured SLAs or by keeping the cloud private.
However, this kind of policies enter in contrast with what is explained in Section 4.3.5 – Economic
Cost  –  where  some  cloud  models  may  allow  CSP  to  use  data  for  several  purposes  like
advertisement.
Given data ownership issues are loosely related with trust and policies, solutions to build up trust
explained in  Section  4.3.2.1.1 and solutions  to define and accommodate policies  explained in
Section 4.3.2.1.2 may prove useful. 
4.3.2.1.4. Changeability of terms
In Cloud Computing, terms of service may be the most important feature for an average user not
subject to legal or professional obligation. When the data is stored on the cloud, it depends on a
third-party company which may reserve the right to change/terminate established terms of service
or privacy policies.  A lack of completeness and transparency in the terms of use  arises several
concerns  to  the customers  as,  depending on  the terms,  privacy  and  confidentiality  risks  vary
significantly [SLR18].
In  the  literature  3 papers  have  been  found  which  explain  or  mention  issues  related  to  the
changeability of terms: [SLR8], [SLR16] and  [SLR18]. [SLR8] and [SLR18] provide actual solutions
or  suggestions  on  this  concern,  while  [SLR16]  provides  review  which  helped  identifying  and
assessing it. figure 4-10 symbolizes the questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,
and  table  4-9 summarizes  all  the  concerns  found  and  their  respective  solutions  proposed  by
authors.
Figure 4-10: Questions raised by actors about changeability of terms
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Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Bankruptcy of CSP - Publish and maintain data interfaces and transformation logic [SLR8]
Change of terms and 
termination of services - Perform adequate legal review of ToS [SLR18]
Table 4-9: Summary of identified issues related to changeability of terms
One possible way a CSP changes its services is, obviously, bankruptcy of the CSP. Mather et al.
[SLR16] rise the concern about if the data is transferable to other third parties upon bankruptcy. In
addition, Gellman [SLR18]  explains that  bankruptcy laws provides limited procedural protections
for customers if the  CSP had a privacy policy prohibiting the transfer of personal information to
unaffiliated people (which, once more, suggest that customers carefully review privacy policies).
To deal with this issue, one solution proposed by Sengupta et al. [SLR8] is that, in order to prevent
data getting locked in the case of a CSP bankruptcy, to publish and maintain a standard set of data
interfaces and transformation logic. This way data can be transferred to other companies with ease
by avoiding vendor lock-up.
Another way a CSP changes its services is if it reserves its right to do so any time. This reduces
the comfortability of the customer,  so Gellman [SLR18] suggests to perform an adequate legal
review of the terms of service. 
Finally, a radical change of terms explained by Gellman is the termination of the services from the
CSP if it reserved the right to do so; a customer who did not keep a backup of his data stored in
the  cloud  may  lose  the  information  permanently,  with  the  subsequent  troubles  for  customer's
company.
To deal with the issue of changing terms, probably the solutions explained in Section  4.3.2.1.2 -
Lack of execution controls and customers' privacy requirements and policies – may be of use as
they deal with finding a proper Cloud Service Provider which fulfils customer's requirements. This
way a more trustworthy relationship between customers and CSP can be established, providing
more comfortability to cloud customers.
4.3.2.1.5. Responsibility for protecting privacy and privacy policy enforcement
The literature is fairly spread about the who is responsible about protecting data privacy and keep
it confidential and protected. Conflicting opinions have been found in the literature about liability on
privacy. So, in order to avoid disputes over responsibility issues,  it needs to be a clear definition
Privacy and Confidentiality issues in Cloud Computing architectures 81
and understanding of roles and responsibilities between the customer and the provider.
In  the  literature,  6 papers  have  been  found  which  deal  with  concerns  related  with  who  is
responsible for ensuring data privacy:  [SLR1],  [SLR5], [SLR16],  [SLR19],  [SLR20] and  [SLR24].
[SLR19], [SLR20] and [SLR24] provide actual solutions on the concern, while [SLR1], [SLR5] and
[SLR16]  provide  reviews  that  helped  identifying  and  assessing  it.  Figure  4-11 symbolizes  the
questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-10 summarizes the evidence
found on this topic as well as their related solutions.
Figure 4-11: Questions raised by actors about responsibility for protecting privacy and privacy policy enforcement
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Who is responsible for 
protecting privacy
- Shared responsibility between provider and customer 
[SLR24]
- Responsibility depends on the cloud deployment model 
[SLR19], [SLR24]
- Liability frameworks
Know if the CSP is fulfilling my
requirements - Deploy audit mechanisms to enforce policies [SLR20]
Table 4-10: Summary of identified issues related to the responsibility for protecting privacy and privacy policy
enforcement
In  their  guidelines  document,  NIST  [SLR20]  explain  that  when  outsourcing  data,  part  of  the
responsibility  and  control  is  transferred  to  the  CSP,  which  generates  a dependency on  the
cooperation of the CSP to perform activities which imply both entities, which  at the same time
increases the complexity of carrying on activities like monitoring, incident response, compliance
with data protection laws, requiring extra coordination efforts between organisation and CSP.
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According to Mather et al. [SLR16], there are conflicting opinions regarding who is responsible for
security and privacy;  some  authors delegate the responsibility to  providers  (without transferring
accountability).  Other  authors  like  Roberts  et  al.  [SLR1],  Mishra  et  al.  [SLR5],  Takade  et  al.
[SLR24] argue that from the public and the law point of view, the user organization is responsible
of data security and privacy. In this sense, security and responsibility are shared between the client
and the service provider and mutual cooperation is necessary. They even say that full reliance on
CSP to protect personal data is irresponsible and can lead to negative consequences.
Nevertheless,  Takade  et  al.  [SLR24] and  the  ENISA report  [SLR19] provide  more  in-depth
information about  the  responsibility  of  privacy,  adding  the deployment  model  as  a  variable  to
determine the responsibility: 
 in SaaS, providers have the most part of responsibility due that they provide the full kit of
features. Customers and providers are responsible of compliance with data protection laws
of customers who use SaaS services while CSP is ultimately responsible of providing and
maintaining physical security and monitoring.
 in  PaaS,  as  developers  build  their  own  applications,  customers  are  responsible  for
protecting  the  data  from  their  applications,  whilst  the  CSP is  responsible  for  ensuring
isolation among other tenants.
 in  IaaS,  like  in  PaaS,  customers  are  responsible  for  securing  the  OS and  its  content
(monitoring,  OS security  patches...),  whilst  the  CSP is  responsible  of  keeping  isolation
between virtual machines and maintaining the physical infrastructure. (see section 4.3.1 –
Virtualization).  The definition of  clear  Service-Level Agreements  also helps in setting-up
priorities and warranties in Cloud Computing. 
This categorization of responsibilities is related to the level of control depending on the delivery
model, as explained in section 2.3, where as the amount of customer's control over infrastructure
grows,  so  does  its  responsibility.  Cloud  customers  need  to  pay  attention  on  the  roles  and
responsibilities between the organisation and the CSP to ensure that requirements are met. What
NIST suggests in order to reduce risks is to deploy audit tools and mechanisms to determine how
data is stored, protected and used, validate the service and verify that policy is enforced [SLR20].
Whatever responsibility assignment is done, ENISA [SLR19] recommends, when contracting cloud
services,  to  carefully  review  terms  of  use  and  SLA  clauses  for  clear  role  definition  and
responsibilities.
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4.3.2.1.6. Audit, monitoring and accountability 
Audit and monitoring deals with how organizations  can  monitor  and control the activities of  their
Cloud Service Providers over their data. More specifically, the purpose is to watch what happened
in the Cloud system in order to ensure that privacy requirements, SLAs and compliance with laws
are  enforced when their  personal information is in the cloud  [SLR10][SLR23][SLR24].  However,
audit and monitoring raises some questions in regard of the matter of collecting usage data,  i.e.
profiling users to ensure high quality service. Customers are likely to not want sometimes that their
actual content is monitored  or give personal information against their will [SLR17][SLR26].  Even
more, under some jurisdictions, Cloud Providers may be obliged to disclose and report information
to authorities and governments (i.e. terrorism, missing children, etc.) [SLR18].
In the literature, 8 papers have been identified which deal with audit, monitoring and accountability
issues: [SLR10], [SLR11],  [SLR16],  [SLR17],  [SLR19], [SLR20],  [SLR23]  and [SLR26].  [SLR11],
[SLR16], [SLR17], [SLR23] and [SLR26] provide solutions to the identified issues on the concern,
while  [SLR10],  [SLR19]  and [SLR20]  provide reviews that  helped identifying  and assessing it.
Figure 4-12 symbolizes the questions that  the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,  and table
4-11 summarizes all the concerns found and their respective solutions proposed by authors.
Figure 4-12: Questions raised by actors about responsibility for protecting privacy and privacy policy enforcement
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Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
When does information 
gathering become intrusive
- Terms and conditions. Balance between collection of 
information and safety of data [SLR11][SLR26]
How can I be sure that my CSP
fulfils my requirements? - Accountability [SLR16][SLR17][SLR23]
Table 4-11: Summary of identified issues related to audit, monitoring and accountability
Inadequate  monitoring  mechanisms  can  lead  to  issues  and  complicate  the  assignment  of
responsibilities. In their guidelines, NIST [SLR20] suggests organisations to have knowledge of
cloud provider's security measures in order to be able to conduct risk management by identifying
vulnerabilities, analyse system security features and ensuring that privacy and security controls are
implemented correctly  in order to meet government security requirements.  Related to this,  the
solution provided by Chou et al. [SLR9]  in section  4.3.2.1.1 -  Lack of execution  and customers'
privacy requirements, ScoRiM, may prove useful as one of the phases of their proposed framework
includes risk assessment.
Another solution proposed by Pearson [SLR17][SLR23] and Mather et al. [SLR16] is accountability.
Accountability is defined in the literature as the capability of identifying which party, with undeniable
evidence, is responsible for specific events, and can be obtained via a combination of regulations,
contracts  and  the  use  of  privacy  technologies  like  system  architectures,  access  controls  and
machine readable policies attached to data in order to enforce the fulfilment of these policies to all
stakeholders [SLR11][SLR16][SLR23]. 
In [SLR23], the authors explain how to implement accountability on the cloud and defend the idea
that, with adequate accountability mechanisms, accountability can solve issues related to security
breaches notifications (see section 4.3.2.1.9 – Privacy breaches notification), how data is managed
in the cloud (see section 4.3.2.1.7. - Unauthorized use of data and access control), builds up trust
on the CSP because processes become clearer, helps in making sure that the cloud service is
compliant  with  laws  and  policies  (see  section  4.3.2.2.1  –  Legal  and  regulatory  issues)  and,
ultimately, location of data becomes a less relevant issue because it is assured that data is treated
as  described  regardless  of  jurisdiction.  In  fact,  accountability  is  included  in  some  privacy
frameworks, like APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,  a framework that provide a set  of
best practices of privacy on Asia-Pacific economic areas [40]). 
Another way to implement accountability is explained by  Zhou et al. [SLR10], which consists on
adding auditability as an additional layer above the virtualized operating system hosted in a Virtual
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Machine,  arguing  that  it  is  much  more  secure  to  implement  auditability over  a  VM  than  an
application or software. The reason is that the system then is able to watch the entire access
duration when implementing auditability over the VM.
Despite the benefits of accountability, Xiao et al. [SLR11] argue that privacy and accountability may
conflict  with  each  other.  In  their  paper,  the  authors  explain  some  of  the  vulnerabilities  and
corresponding solutions to accountability. In regards of privacy, one of these issues is that the
enforcement of  accountability will violate privacy in some degree due to the data collection, and
extreme privacy protection (i.e. full anonymity) will make accountability more difficult and harder to
apply.  Some  accountability  operations  like  logging  or  tracing  cannot  be  performed  without
disclosing some private information (like IP addresses). The authors advocates for a balance in
order to offer the best efficient service. Other issues relate to cloud integrity and availability, which
are out of the scope of this Master Thesis.
In  symphony  with  Xiao  et  al,  Jaeger  et  al.  [SLR26]  mention  that  many  companies  provide
contextualized ads based on keywords, Web sites viewed (like Amazon ads), etc. The authors ask
themselves if users really want this to happen, as corporate users may be more concerned about
monitoring  of  information  than  regular  customers  who  just  use  e-mail  solutions  like  Gmail.
Sometimes the barrier that separates gathering information to increase service quality and data
mining is not clear enough.
Another issue explained by the ENISA report [SLR19] regards compliance and certifications. When
migrating to the cloud, some companies may have made investments in achieving certifications for
meeting standards, competitive advantage  or compliance with laws and regulations. However, if
the Cloud Provider does not provide audit tools to customers, or provider cannot deliver evidence
of their compliance to requirements, companies' certification and compliance requirements can be
affected as well.  Related to this, Mather et al. [SLR16] suggest Cloud Service Providers to apply
compliance frameworks and standards to manage risks and satisfy customers while providing
higher degree of trust. Some of the frameworks and certifications mentioned are ITIL (Information
Technology Infrastructure Library, which basically is a set of best practices), NIST guidelines or
ISO 27001 [41] and, as mentioned previously, APEC.
4.3.2.1.7. Unauthorized use of data and access control
Another issue found in the literature is the unwanted usage of the data from the CSP, how to make
sure this doesn't happen and restrict/limit the access to personal information.
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In the literature,  8 papers have been identified which deal with  the issue of unauthorized use of
data:  [SLR7],  [SLR16],  [SLR18],  [SLR19],  [SLR20],  [SLR22],  [SLR24]  and [SLR27]. [SLR7],
[SLR16], [SLR19], [SLR22], [SLR24] and [SLR27] provide actual solutions on the concern, while
[SLR18]  and  [SLR20]  provide  reviews  that  helped  identifying  and  assessing  it.  Figure  4-13
symbolizes  the  questions  that  the  main  Cloud  actors  arise  on  the  matter,  and  table  4-12
summarizes all the concerns found and their respective solutions proposed by authors.
Figure 4-13: Questions raised by actors about unauthorized use of data and access control
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Prevent use of my data in 
ways I have not authorized
- Trust in the CSP [SLR24]
- User-centric trust-model privacy management tool [SLR27]
Prevent access to 
unauthorized parties
- Identity and Access Management Protocols (IAM) [SLR7]
[SLR8][SLR16][SLR20]
- User-centric Identity Management (IDM) [SLR22][SLR24]
Table 4-12: Summary of identified issues related to unauthorized use of data and access control
One issue found in the literature is how to ensure that no malicious CSP employees access the
data. Concerns could arise from secondary use of information by CSP, like the selling of personal
information (i.e. a private photography of a user stored in the cloud may be sold for marketing
purposes)  [SLR18].  Takade  et  al.  [SLR24]  explain  that  it  is  improbable  that  there  is  any
full-technical mean to prevent CSP to use the data in ways that have not been agreed with the
customer, so combination of technical and non-technical approaches are necessary. The authors
regard trust in the CSP as the most important attribute to guarantee data safety. CSP can build up
trust using one of the ways explained in section 4.3.2.1.6 - Audit, monitoring and accountability -
as accountability and auditability solutions can help enforcing a correct usage of the data.
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Even though Takade et al. [SLR24] suggest that there is no way to prevent malicious use of data
from the CSP,  Chen et al. [SLR27]  explain and  propose  a user-centric, trust model client-based
privacy management tool developed by Mowbray  [42], which  can help users control the storage
and use of their sensitive data in the cloud. However, no more information has been found in the
literature for this SLR about this approach.
Regarding issues about who access data and how,  one approach discussed  and proposed  by
Almulla and Yeun [SLR7],  NIST [SLR20],  Sengupta et al.  [SLR8] and Mather et al.  [SLR16] to
prevent  unauthorized  use  and  access  of  data  are  Identity  and  Access  Management  (IAM)
protocols. More specifically, in their paper explain Security assertion Markup Language (SaML),
and Open Authentication (OAuth)  protocol.  SaML is  an authentication protocol  based on XML
standards and it  is used to exchange authorization and authentication information between the
Identity provider and Cloud Service Provider.  OAuth  is an authentication protocol which  allows
users to share their  private data located on one CSP with another  CSP without  exposing the
personal identity information like usernames and passwords. 
However,  before  applying  the  explained  IAM protocols,  it  is  mandatory  that  the  organisations
checks if they are suitable for it [SLR20]. ENISA [SLR19] suggests defining good key management
procedures, as the loss or corruption of keys for digital signatures and file encryption can hinder
personal data. Another suggestion made by Mather et al. [SLR16] to deal with decentralised and
inconsistent  IAM application  consists  in  finding technology solutions  to enable  centralized and
automated user access management. However this kind of implementations can last years and
incur considerable costs.
Another solution to prevent unauthorized use of data or security breaches proposed by Takade et
al.  [SLR24]  and A.  Cavoukian [SLR22] is  User-centric  Identity  Management  (IDM).  IDM is an
approach for handling private identity attributes, whose goal is to allow users control their digital
identities,  determine  what  information  will  be  revealed  to  who  and  for  what  purpose.  With
User-centric IDM part of personal data management is relegated from companies  and the CSP.
One example explained by Cavoukian [SLR22] is the use of identity services (he mentions OpenID
as  an  example),  which  can  provide  greater  control  over  personal  information.  These  identity
services allow customers to store their credentials on a service and reuse them all around the Web
without having to manage multiple accounts and passwords.
However,  and  according  to  Cavoukian,  User-centric  IDM  requires  a  clear  framework  of
agreed-upon rules between the customer and the CSP which includes policies that describe what
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information is requested and why,  and include a machine-readable policy that  travels with the
personal  information to ensure  that  this  data is  only  used in  accordance to this  policy.  Some
suggestions  made by  the author  in  order  to  exploit  the  full  potential  of  this  kind  of  personal
information management in Cloud Computing are: 
 Identity  management  service  companies  require  to  build  up trust  in  order  to  incite
companies use them and take advantage of them.
 Standards  organisations  and  governments  should  develop  and  promote  standards  for
identity  systems  and  privacy-enhancing  technologies,  and  software  developers  should
make use of them.
Finally,  it seems reasonable that the proposals in Section 4.3.3 – Encryption could deal with the
problem of  unauthorized use of  data as both issues pursue the same goal  of  protecting data
confidentiality  from third-parties.  Also,  accountability  (section  4.3.2.1.5 – Audit,  monitoring  and
accountability) could serve as a mean to track how is data managed and who access what data.
4.3.2.1.8. Multiple service composition
Sometimes, service providers cooperate with each other to provide bigger application services to
customers. However, this raises several issues which are discussed below.
In the literature,  1 paper has been found related to the issue of  multiple service composition:
[SLR24],  which identifies the concern and provides a solution to it.  Figure 4-14 symbolizes the
questions that  the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,  and Table  4-13 summarizes the found
concerns about the matter.
Figure 4-14: Questions raised by actors about multiple service composition
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Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Ensure correct policy 
integration among CSP - Trust-based interoperation frameworks [SLR24]
Table 4-13: Summary of identified issues related to multiple service composition
In  their  review paper,  Takade et  al.  [SLR24]  explain that  different  service providers may have
different security and privacy mechanisms, so it is necessary to ensure that these collaborations
are monitored effectively because, even though individual policies are verified, security violations
can occur during the policy integration. One suggestion the authors make to solve this issue is the
development  of  trust-based  interoperation  frameworks  to  capture  the  parameters  required  to
manage interaction requirements and policy-evolution management. 
The policy integration matter is related with the proposal made by Lin et al. [SLR3], which may help
solving the issue explained above. Research should be done to validate this. See section 4.3.2.1.1.
– Lack of execution controls and customers' privacy requirements – for more information.
4.3.2.1.9. Privacy breaches notification
Privacy breaches notification deals with how organizations are notified when a data leakage occurs
(which may inevitably happen sometimes). 
In the literature 1 work has been identified which deals with privacy breaches notification issues:
[SLR16],  which provides review that helps identifying the issue although no solution has been
proposed.  Figure 4-15 symbolizes the questions that  the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,
and table 4-14 summarizes the found concerns about privacy breaches notifications.
Figure 4-15: Questions raised by actors about privacy breaches notification
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Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
How to ensure that CSP 
notifies you when a breach 
occurs
- No solutions found in the literature
Who is responsible for 
managing the breach 
notification process
- No solutions found in the literature
If the contract policy include 
liability - No solutions found in the literature
Table 4-14: Summary of identified issues related to privacy breaches notification
Basically and regarding to this topic, Mather et al. [SLR16] poses the question that how a company
can ensure that the CSP notifies it when a privacy breach occurs, who manages the notification
process and how is the responsibility contract enforced in case of a CSP negligence to determine
the fault. These questions have a relationship with the trust of the cloud provider, as a trusted CSP
provider has more chances to fulfil the SLAs.
Although no direct evidence has been found in the literature to solve these issues, accountability
and  audit  frameworks  may  help  to  detect  privacy  breaches,  as  it  deals  with  the  tracking  of
problems. See section  4.3.2.1.5 – Audit, monitoring and accountability – for more information.
4.3.2.2. Offshoring
Offshoring  refers  to  the  mobility  of  data  across  jurisdictions  (your  data  crosses  international
boundaries).  Offshoring  of  data  increases  risk  factors  and  legal  complexity,  which  poses  a
challenge for  companies  who serve customers from multiple  jurisdictions  [SLR10][SLR16]  and
directly affects  and complicates  compliance  with the laws  in Cloud Computing architectures,  as
various types of security and privacy laws and regulations exist  within different countries.  One
definition of compliance provided by  NIST [SLR20]  is “organization’s responsibility to operate in
agreement with established laws, regulations, standards, and specifications”. Mather et al [SLR16]
adds to this definition also that compliance deals with who is responsible for maintaining it.
For the sake of simplicity, we will divide the issues related to Offshoring in two subsections, one
focused on general issues, and the other one focused on legal and regulatory issues.
4.3.2.2.1. Offshoring: General issues
In  the  literature,  5 works have been identified which deal  with  general  issues related to Data
offshoring:  [SLR10],  [SLR14],  [SLR16],  [SLR18] and [SLR19].  These works provide identify the
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issues around this concern and provide solutions to them.  Figure 4-16 symbolizes the questions
that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-15 summarizes the concerns found in
the literature about Offshoring in cloud computing and their respective found solutions.
Figure 4-16: Questions raised by actors about general issues of offshoring
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Which jurisdiction applies?
- Depends on the implicated countries and privacy laws: 
Applies the jurisdiction where data is physically located, or 
the jurisdiction of the subjects of data, or company's location 
[SLR10] [SLR18]
- CSP can ensure to keep data inside a specific jurisdiction 
[SLR10] [SLR18]
- Ask the CSP for any remarkable detail about data location 
and legal concerns [SLR19]
How is compliance impacted 
by moving to the cloud and 
where should I store my data
- Transfer principles [SLR14, SLR16]
- Store data on specific jurisdictions to minimize legal risks 
[SLR14, SLR16]
Table 4-15: Summary of identified issues related to general issues of offshoring
In Cloud Computing, the location of the data may not be notified to the cloud customer due to the
loss of governance over data and processes [SLR19]. One of the issues found in the literature and
expressed by Mather et al. [SLR16] is which jurisdiction applies when information crosses borders
and how it is determined.  Special  care has to be taken about  the jurisdiction,  as the applied
jurisdiction to the data may, in some cases, provide unlimited access to the stored data ( i.e. China
legislation).
A CSP can promise through policy to maintain user data in a specific jurisdiction, reducing some of
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the location risks that a user may face. However this is not typically the case, and data may be split
or mirrored  in multiple jurisdictions in the cloud, making it unclear which laws apply to the data.
This could lead companies to violate regulations without even noticing it [SLR19]. The point of view
of Zhou et al. [SLR10] and Gellman [SLR18] is fairly different from Mather et al. [SLR16] (who say
it  is  not  sure the jurisdiction that  applies). Zhou et  al.  and Gellman explain that  jurisdiction is
determined differently in different countries:  some  privacy  laws are based on the location of the
organization, some on the physical location of the data centre, and some on the location of the
data subjects.
Another issue exposed by Mather et al. [SLR16] is how the impact on compliance with laws is
determined when a customer decides to move his data to the cloud.  Some countries may allow
personal  information to be processed without  the awareness of  the data subject,  while in  EU
countries, for instance, only allow personal information to be processed if the data subject is aware
of the processing and its purpose, and place special restrictions on the processing of sensitive data
(for  example,  health  or  financial  data),  and  explicit  consent  of  the  data  owner  is  necessary
[SLR14]. To prevent this kind of issue, Mather et al. propose two solutions: 
 One solution is  what  are called the “Transfer principles”, under a set of privacy principles
defined  in  their  book.  These principles specify that  data  should  not  be  transferred  to
countries that do not provide the same level of privacy protection as the organisation who
collected the information.
 The  other  solution  consists  that  CSP should  store  data  on  servers  located  in  specific
jurisdictions that minimize legal risks. They empathize that these location may be outside
Europe and United States in order to prevent the legal and sometimes contradictory point of
view of privacy (when organisation deliver services around the world).
The ENISA report [SLR19] recommends customers to ask any legal questions to the cloud provider
in  order  to  ensure  the location  of  data  and infrastructure,  the  outsourced services  and which
jurisdiction applies.
Finally,  Gellman [SLR18] makes a remark on data location and provides a different point of view
from the other authors who try to deal with data location issues and ambiguity. Even though in the
literature data location is perceived as an issue rather than an advantage,  Gellman explains that
uncertainty in location can be beneficial for someone who tries to keep data out of the reach of a
government or litigant.
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4.3.2.2.2. Legal and regulatory issues
As explained in the offshoring general issues, privacy laws vary according to jurisdiction. Currently,
most legal issues in Cloud Computing are resolved during the evaluation of contracts, Service
Level  Agreements  (SLA)  and  User  Licensing  Agreements  (ULA).  However,  some  privacy
protection laws are either ambiguous, or out of date and did not keep in pace with technology.
In  the  literature,  3 works  have  been  identified  which  deal  with  issues  related  to  Legal  and
regulatory issues in  Cloud Computing:  [SLR10], [SLR16],  and [SLR18].  These works identify the
several  concerns  around  this  topic  and  provide  solutions  for  it. Figure  4-17 symbolizes  the
questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-16 summarizes the concerns
found in the literature about the topic in Cloud Computing and their respective found suggestions.
Figure 4-17: Questions raised by actors about legal and regulatory issues
Issue Proposed solutions / responses / suggestions
Different points of view and 
concepts about privacy. 
Conflicting regulations
- No solutions have been found in the literature
Outdated and inapplicable 
laws and regulations
- Apply and discuss changes to adapt them to Cloud 
Computing paradigm [SLR10][SLR16][SLR18]
Table 4-16: Summary of identified legal and regulatory issues
One issue Mather et al. [SLR16] describe in their book is the different understanding and points of
view over privacy,  which are the reason of multiple legal battles, political disputes and conflicting
regulations. Some examples of conflicting regulations  the authors explain are the U.S. Federal
Rules of Civil  Procedure (FRCP) and EU Directive.  In Europe, privacy is considered like a basic
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human right and processing of personal data is forbidden,  whilst in U.S. national security takes
precedence  over  privacy  (e.g.  the  USA Patriot  Act,  which  is  explained  below,  is  the  most
controversial law and has arose several disputes among countries according to Mather et al.)
Zhou et  al.  [SLR10],  Mather et  al.  [SLR16] and R. Gellman [SLR18]  identify issues related to
several acts that try to protect data privacy. They explain that, even though many laws have been
published to protect users' privacy and businesses secrets, they are out of date and inapplicable to
scenarios where more parties enter in action (like Cloud Computing).  The authors suggest that
these acts require discussion and changes to adapt to Cloud Computing environment. 
The following list describes these problematic laws and the issues that have been found on them in
the literature:
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). ECPA are a set of U.S. laws that
provide protections against government to access electronic information stored in devices
of third parties (e.g. Internet Service Providers (ISP)), including mail and other computer
information.  However,  Xiao  et  al  [SLR11]. and  R.  Gellman  [SLR18] explain that  these
regulations are outdated because ECPA relies on a model of e-mail and Internet that is
generations behind current technology and practices and they protect privacy between only
two parties (in cloud environment more parties besides Cloud Service Provide and Cloud
user come into play, like governments), making it difficult to figure out what of those ECPA
protections apply to Cloud Computing and when.
 Legally Privileged Information: Some laws establish regulations on the data privacy in the
relationship of two or more parties, e.g. doctor-patient, lawyer-client, etc. Gellman [SLR18]
argues that when information is legally privileged, sharing that information with a CSP can
affect the validity of the privilege.  For instance, if a patient shares a record containing a
confidential  communication  with  a  cloud  provider  and  the  cloud  provider  uses  the
information in that record to serve an advertisement to the patient, the privilege may be
utterly undermined.
 USA PATRIOT Act (UPA). This act allows FBI to access any business record under court
order. As Cloud providers are businesses, it allows FBI to access Cloud user's private data
as well.
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): HIPAA regulates the use and
disclosure of protected health information by health care providers. However, according to
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Mather et al. [SLR16], it does not currently regulate the third-party providers of health care
businesses, so a legal demand by a private party to a  CSP for disclosure of protected
health information would lead users’ private information to be disclosed.
 Gramm Leach Bliley  Act  (GLBA):  GLBA restricts  financial  institutions  from disclosing a
consumer’s personal financial information to a non-affiliated third party. However, disclosure
to a CSP is not restricted, thus exposing cloud users' financial records.
4.3.2.3. Data combination and commingling
Data combination deals with the separation of customer's stored private data in the cloud with that
of other tenants. 
In the literature, 1 paper has been identified which mentions issues about data combination  and
commingling: [SLR10], which identifies the concern. Figure 4-18 symbolizes the questions that the
main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-17 summarizes the found concerns about data
combination and commingling.
Figure 4-18: Questions raised by actors about data combination and commingling
Issue Proposed solutions / responses
Is my data separated from 
other tenants - No solutions found in the literature
Table 4-17: Summary of identified issues related to data combination and commingling
According to Zhou et al. [SLR10], cloud customers need to be sure whether its private data is
being stored separately from others or not. If they are combined with those of other tenants’ data
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(like the same database), then this data becomes much more unsafe as it becomes more prone to
attacks or virus transmission, as one attack to one victim may affect the availability or data integrity
of other companies located in the same multi-tenant environment.
Although no direct evidence has been found in the literature, given that this concern is somewhat
related to virtualization issues, probably this opens a gate that concerns and solutions provided in
Section  4.3.1. – Virtualization – may be applied as well to data combination and commingling.
More research in this area should be performed. 
4.3.3. Encryption
Encryption, as explained in section 2.5.1, is the process of encoding messages or information in a
way that that only authorized parties can read this information, preventing unwanted parties and
hackers read it [43]. To protect the confidentiality of sensitive data stored in the cloud, encryption is
the widely accepted technique  in Cloud Computing architectures.  In fact, encryption is the only
recognized standard for data protection, like the NIST Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) [SLR16]. Nevertheless,  encryption is  not all-purpose  as it alone  cannot provide complete
solutions to all privacy issues in cloud computing, and it complicates query processing on the data. 
Most of the evidence found in the literature agrees that the biggest problem regarding encrypted
data in the cloud is data access efficiency while preserving confidentiality.
In the literature,  14 papers which deal with encryption issues and proposals have been found:
[SLR2], [SLR4], [SLR5], [SLR7], [SLR9],  [SLR10],  [SLR11], [SLR14], [SLR18], [SLR19],  [SLR20],
[SLR24],  [SLR25]  and  [SLR27].  [SLR2],  [SLR4],  [SLR5],  [SLR7],  [SLR9], [SLR11], [SLR14],
[SLR18],  [SLR20],  [SLR24]  and [SLR25]  provide actual solutions to the identified issues on this
concern,  while  [SLR10],  [SLR19]  and  [SLR27]  provide  reviews  that  helped  identifying  and
assessing it. Figure 4-19 symbolizes the questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,
and  table  4-18 summarizes  the  issues  found  and  solutions  proposed  about  the  topic in  the
literature.
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Figure 4-19: Questions raised by actors about encryption
Issue Proposed solutions / responses
Data retrieval efficiency while 
keeping confidentiality
- Homomorphic encryption [SLR2][SLR9]
- Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [SLR2][SLR4]
- Obfuscation [SLR4][SLR14][SLR25]
- Secure co-processors [SLR2]
- Secure index based framework [SLR2]
- Trusted hardware token with Secure Function Evaluation 
[SLR11]
- Privacy-preserving repository [SLR5]
Confidentiality protection of 
data
- NIST encryption standards [SLR7][SLR20]
- Data-centric security approach [SLR24]
Secure communications and 
prevent vulnerabilities
- Anonymous communication through Onion Routing 
[SLR18]
Table 4-18: Summary of identified issues related to encryption
One important issue mentioned in the literature is the process of encrypted data. According to
Chen et al. [SLR27] in traditional computing the data being treated is almost not encrypted for any
program to use. However, in the cloud, due to the multi-tenancy feature, the data being processed
by cloud-based applications is stored together with the data of other users, and unencrypted data
in the process is a serious threat to data security. So solutions to process data while in encrypted
state become necessary.
Agrawal  et  al.  [SLR2]  and  Pearson et  al.  [SLR4] review several techniques for  supporting the
process of  encrypted data.  Regarding confidentiality  protection,  they  mention a solution  called
Private Information Retrieval (PIR), which can hide any query done on encrypted data. However,
 98 Privacy and confidentiality issues and challenges in Cloud Computing: Systematic Review results analysis
and according to the authors,  PIR is too expensive in terms of communication and computation,
solutions based on query processing over encrypted data are not practical yet, as they are not
flexible  (designed  for  a  specific  query),  or  they  do  not  support  another  type  of  queries  (like
updates), or they trade confidentiality by functionality.
Chou et al. [SLR9] add to the previous statement that most of the current encryption solutions do
not allow the processing of data in encrypted state. [SLR9], [SLR2], [SLR19] and [SLR27] mention
as a possible existing solution the Homomorphic encryption,  developed by IBM in 2009, which
enables secure calculation on encrypted data; however  homomorphic encryption comes with the
drawback that it takes high computation cost and time to run operations over encrypted data.
In order to keep data confidential while having efficient data access,  one solution  Pearson et al.
[SLR4],  [SLR14],  [SLR25] propose is  a privacy manager that relies on obfuscation techniques to
enhance confidentiality. The privacy manager can provide obfuscation and de-obfuscation service
to reduce the amount of sensitive information stored in the cloud  and reduce the risk for data
leakage and loss of privacy. The main idea is to store the clients’ data in a encrypted form in the
cloud, and the data process is directly performed on the encrypted data. One limitation is that CSP
may not be willing to implement additional services for privacy protection.  So, without provider’s
cooperation, this scheme will not work.
Another  solution  proposed  by Agrawal  et  al.  [SLR2] for  efficient  data  access  while  keeping
confidentiality  is the use of a secure co-processor on the cloud server side and put all sensitive
data process inside that co-processor. However this comes with the drawback that every client in
the CSP cloud should trust the co-processor.  So, in the end, to solve these issues,  the authors
propose a  secure index based framework to support efficient processing of multiple database
queries  and  practical  secure  data  management  while  preserving  both  confidentiality  and
functionality.  This  framework  is  based on not  processing encrypted data  directly  like  previous
mentioned solutions, instead it uses an encrypted index which allows to locate and retrieve the
data faster (in a small number of rounds) and does not rely on the CSP. This solution may solve
the problem of the solution proposed by [SLR4] as their solution required the cooperation of CSP.
In their  paper,  Mishra and Dash [SLR5] propose a repository for preserving privacy of  data in
cloud,  facilitating the integration  and  sharing  of  data  across  cloud  while preserving data
confidentiality,  and delegates most computation intensive like encryption tasks to the server.  The
process consists as follows: when a user makes a query, this repository analyses user's integration
requirements and constructs and decomposes the query plan for his query, discovers and fetches
data from the cloud service, assimilates all data together, and returns the final results to users. All
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this process is managed under encryption. This solution is somewhat related to that of [SLR2] as
they both deal with query processing, although in [SLR5] it is not clear whether their solution is
practical in terms of computation cost or not as there is not any demonstration.  The authors say
that the benefits that this repository provides are: in the process, it can be known who is using the
data and in what way (certain degree of accountability,  see section 4.3.2.1.6 – Audit, monitoring
and  accountability),  and  the  dispatched  information  is  adequate  to  support  clients’ integration
requirements, but carries no extra information of the data and that it is cost-effective and robust.
Another  solution explained by  Xiao et  al.  [SLR11]  is a proposal made by Sadeghi  et  al.  They
propose to combine a trusted hardware token with Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in order to
compute arbitrary functions on data when it is still in encrypted form. The goal of this work is to
minimize  the  computation  latency  to  enable  efficient  and secure  data  outsourcing  in  cloud
computing. The computation leaks no information and is verifiable. 
Regarding the way data is stored in the cloud,  Almulla and Yeun [SLR7]  suggest that encryption
techniques  like  symmetric  or  asymmetric  encryption  algorithms  and  key  management  of  the
symmetric cipher  should be taken into consideration in  order to ensure that  data in the cloud
cannot  be accessed  by  unauthorized  parties. Zhou  et  al.  explain  in  [SLR10]  that  this  kind  of
approach was successfully used by TC3, a healthcare company with access to sensitive patient
records and healthcare claims, when moving their HIPAA-compliant application to Amazon Web
Services. [SLR7] also suggest that NIST encryption standards [SLR20] should be implemented in
order to protect confidentiality.
Another issue found in the literature explained by Takade et al. [SLR24] is that data owners should
have full control over who has the right to use the data in the cloud and what they are allowed to do
with it. To provide this data control, authors suggest the use of what they call “data-centric security
approach”, based on encryption and usage policy rules, so when someone tries to access the data,
the system checks its policy rules and only provides the data if the policy is satisfied.
Regarding encrypted communications,  the ENISA report  [SLR19] makes a mention on several
vulnerabilities  which can affect personal data  while being transferred: MITM  (man-in-the-middle)
attacks,  poor  authentication  and acceptance of  self-signed certificates.  No more evidence has
been found in the literature about these issues. On the other hand and related to communications,
Gellman [SLR18]  opens the gate for further research on this area with the envisioning of “onion
cloud providers” which may make the pursue and finding of data very difficult. More specifically, he
explains  a  technique  for  anonymous  communication  over  the  network  called  Onion Routing,
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which consists on repeatedly encrypt a message and send it through multiple network nodes called
onion routers. Each onion router removes a layer of encryption to uncover routing instructions and
sends the message to the next router.  This process is repeated until  the message reaches its
destination. 
4.3.4. Storage, retention and destruction of data
Retention deals with how long personal information transferred to the cloud is retained and which
retention policy applies to this data; Destruction deals with how cloud providers destroy personal
information  when  the  retention  period  ends  and  how  organizations  ensure  that  their  data  is
destroyed and is not available to other cloud users. In cloud computing data is outsourced and the
lack of control on this data raises issues regarding the maintenance of this data.
In  the  literature 4 papers  make  references about retention  and  destruction  of  data:  [SLR8],
[SLR12],  [SLR16] and [SLR20].  [SLR8]  and  [SLR20]  provide  actual  solutions  to  the  issues
identified on this concern, while [SLR12] and [SLR16] provide reviews that helped identifying and
assessing it. Figure 4-20 symbolizes the questions that the main Cloud actors arise on the matter,
and table 4-19 summarizes the issues found and solutions proposed about storage, retention and
data destruction in the literature.
Figure 4-20: Questions raised by actors about storage, retention and destruction of data
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Issue Proposed solutions
Who enforces retention policy - No solutions found for this concern in the literature
In which media is data stored - No suggestions nor proposed solutions found in the literature
Prevent data concentration 
vulnerabilities and the stored 
data is correctly isolated
- No suggestions nor proposed solutions found in the 
literature
How much time is my data 
kept - Review policies [SLR20]
How to make sure data is 
properly destroyed
- Encrypt unwanted data and destroy the key [SLR8]
- Review SLAs and policies [SLR20]
Table 4-19: Summary of identified issues related to storage, retention and destruction of data
Mather et al. [SLR16]  and ENISA report [SLR19]  pose some of the  issues that arise regarding
retention and destruction of data:  Who enforces the retention policy in the cloud, and how are
exceptions to this policy managed?  Is my unwanted data truly destroyed in the cloud?.  These
questions are closely related to data outsourcing (see  section  4.3.2.1 – Data outsourcing) and
responsibility of data (see section 4.3.2.1.5 - Responsibility for protecting privacy and privacy policy
enforcement).
Related to retention and according to Ma [SLR12],  the kind of storage used by the CSP (RAIDs,
portable media, etc.) is an important factor, as there are risks associated depending on the device
used, and that the archival of data fulfils legal requirements (usually it is more unsafe to put data
on portable devices than RAIDs, for example). However this information is not typically disclosed to
customers, which in some cases may be a problem.
In reference to the storage of information, NIST Guidelines [SLR20] explain that depending on the
CSP deployed infrastructure, data concentration is an issue as there is more data concentrated in
a single point,  making it  valuable attack targets, so isolation is necessary to minimize risks. In
special, NIST places special concerns on which data should be located alongside high-importance
data present in a device, as it is more likely that attackers may insist more over it.
Another issue regarding the destruction of data explained by Sengupta et al. [SLR8] is that some
services (like Google Gears) cache data on their  devices,  and if  this  data is not  secured and
purged on a regular basis, the data is prone to attacks and pose a serious risk to privacy. On the
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same matter, Ma [SLR12]  and NIST [SLR20] explain that when a file is deleted, the file name is
removed from the directory, but the actual data still remains on the disk, and attackers still can use
special techniques to get the deleted data back (so, data must be destroyed in a secure manner).
So, in order to be sure that data cannot be accessed any more, NIST [SLR20] suggests that SLAs
should define the measures that are taken to ensure that data is completely destroyed. Another
approach Sengupta et al. [SLR8]  explain is to encrypt the data and then destroy the key so it is
guaranteed that no one can access that information.
4.3.5. Economic cost
In the literature we have seen many technologies and solutions to solve privacy and confidentiality
in the cloud issues and meet users' requirements. However, at the same time, with the increased
amount of processed data, the cost for privacy protection also increases  making some of those
solutions not feasible for a commoditized environment like Cloud Computing [SLR15], which, in the
end, becomes an issue. 
In the literature, 5 works have been identified which deal or mention privacy costs on implementing
Cloud  Computing solutions:  [SLR3],  [SLR6],  [SLR15],  [SLR20] and [SLR23].  [SLR6],  [SLR15],
[SLR20] and [SLR23] provide suggestions for the different issues, while [SLR3] makes a review
that helped identifying and assessing the concern. Figure 4-21 symbolizes the questions that the
main Cloud actors arise on the matter, and table 4-20 summarizes the issues found and solutions
proposed in the literature about economic costs on privacy and confidentiality solutions.
Figure 4-21: Questions raised by actors about privacy economic cost
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Issue Proposed solutions
Which cost models are 
available while preserving 
privacy
- Allow the usage of analytics over data and allow contextual 
advertisement [SLR20][SLR23]
- Low fee, non-negotiable terms services [SLR20]
- Fee-based negotiable terms services [SLR20]
How to keep privacy costs 
under control
- Privacy-aware inter-cloud data integration system [SLR15]
- Privacy-as-a-Service (PaaS) [SLR6]
Table 4-20: Summary of identified issues related to privacy economic cost
One  method  explained  by  Pearson  and  Charlesworth [SLR23]  for cost-saving  data  process
consists on providing the CSP with permission to use analytics or even analyse data stored and
demand advertisers, in order for the user to receive free services. They mention as example of this
the  Google’s business model,  centred on providing free service to users while using information
obtained to benefit  advertisers.  However,  organizations and individuals will  not  want  their  data
used  for information for advertisers,  so this will  likely  require the users to  choose services that
include fees but offer higher confidentiality and do not sell data to advertisers. 
Related to what Pearson  and Charlesworth explained, NIST [SLR20] provides a classification of
types of cloud services models depending on the cost with the aim of advising customers that,
when moving to cloud, they should choose carefully the destination of their data: 
 The  first  one  are  services  provided  with  no  cost  to  consumers,  supported  through
advertisements (like  mail).  However  this  presents the issue that  these services usually
collect  information  from the  usage  and  customer's  personal  information  and  encrypted
communications may be unavailable.
 The second one provides services to customer's at a low fee, with similar capabilities as
those of the first classification, and more safety and less private data collection. However,
the terms of service in these cases are usually non-negotiable and CSP can modify them
unilaterally (see section 4.3.2.1.4 - Changeability of terms - ).
 The third one provides fee-based services with negotiable terms of service between the
organization and the CSP. NIST explains that the costs generally depend on the deviation
from non-negotiable-term services.
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In their paper, Tian et al. [SLR15] explain some solutions from other authors like privacy preserving
repositories to accept integration requirements from users (like the privacy repository explained in
[SLR5]), help data sharing and return the data integration results to users, keeping the processing
of data secure by randomizing the data before sending it to the repository, and using encryption
algorithms. However, they did not consider the practicability of uploading all the unprocessed data
to the repository and the high cost for transmitting the data to the cloud. Related to this issue, Lin
et  al.  [SLR3]  comment  that  privacy  protection  techniques  should  not  add  a  significant
communication  overhead,  and therefore the communication  cost  before  and after  using policy
enforcement techniques should be compared.
Tian et al. suggest that privacy may be offered as a new service in the cloud environment, in which
customers pay a different  price for  those privacy services with different  protection assurances
according to the importance of data. Based on this analysis, the authors present a privacy-aware
inter-cloud  data  integration  system,  which  considers  the trade-off between  the  privacy
requirements from users and the charging for those data protection and processing.  This idea is
very much related to the Privacy as a Service approach proposed by Itani  et  al.  [SLR6]  (see
section  4.3.2.1.2 –  Lack  of  execution  controls,  customers'  privacy  requirements  and  policies),
where they both suggest providing privacy as a low cost service.
The aim of the system proposed by Tian et al.  is to mediate between users' privacy preferences
and  the  cost  for  privacy  protection.  A schema  of  this  system  can  be  seen  in  Figure  4-22.
Summarizing how it works, users send their query to the repository cloud, and then, after the query
plan executor  processes query,  given user's  preferences (by setting risk values to decide the
importance of data) and estimating the cost of that query in terms of encrypting, uploading and
downloading of data, the query plan processor decides whether to execute that query or not. This
way privacy is maintained based on users' requirements and cost.
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Figure 4-22: Privacy-aware inter-cloud data integration system architecture
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Chapter 5: Discussion
5.1. Conclusions from the Review
In Chapter 4 we have seen that privacy is probably the most common and important problem any
organization faces when it decides to move to Cloud Computing, even more than data integrity or
availability.  Information  is  the  currency  of  21st century,  and  depending  on  the  type  of  this
information, it can be priceless.  Many companies heavily doubt on moving their data to the cloud,
as sometimes a simple leakage of information or a bad usage of it can lead to bankruptcy of the
company.
However,  the  so-claimed  cost-savings  of  leverage on  Cloud  Computing  technologies  and
approaches heavily attract customers as explained in Chapter 2. However, as we have seen in the
SLR, the amount of issues and concerns raised by privacy and confidentiality matters is not small
at all. Depending on the size of the company who decides to move to the cloud and the kind of
data they wish to move there for storage or processing, special measures and assessments should
be made to minimize any possible risk and comply with laws and regulations.  For this reason,
industry and researchers put lots of efforts to address these issues and build-up trust in the cloud,
so more companies can benefit from its economic benefits without worrying too much.
Based  on  the  descriptions  and  definitions  found  in  the  literature  on  the  different  privacy  and
confidentiality issues, requirements and data life-cycle phases (see section 4.1 and section 4.2),
we establish  in  table  5-1  a  relationship  between each  privacy  requirement  phase of  the  data
life-cycle and their associated phases and identified issues in the literature. The objective of doing
this is raising discussion through finding similarities, differences and gaps, help us extracting more
elaborated conclusions,  assess whether  requirements are being fulfilled  and  suggest  research
directions to any uncovered gap we may find.
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Requirements Phases Related Issues
Notice, openness 
and transparency
- Generation of the 
information
- Use
- Transfer
- Transforming and sharing
- Storage
- Archival
- Destruction
- Lack of execution controls, Customers' 
privacy requirements and policies
- Data ownership
- Changeability of terms
- Responsibility for protecting privacy and 
privacy policy enforcement
- Privacy breaches notification
Choice, consent 
and control
- Generation of the 
information
- Use
- Archival
- Unauthorized use of data and access control
- Multiple service composition
Scope / 
minimization
- User
- Archival
- Destruction
- Unauthorized use of data and access control
- Storage, retention and destruction of data
Purpose - User
- Archival
- Destruction
- Unauthorized use of data and access control
- Storage, retention and destruction of data
Access and 
accuracy
- Storage
- Transforming and sharing
- Unauthorized use of data and access control
Security safeguards - Generation of the 
information
- Use
- Transfer
- Transforming and sharing
- Storage
- Archival
- Destruction
- Virtualization
- Encryption
Compliance - Generation of the 
information
- Use
- Transfer
- Transforming and sharing
- Storage
- Archival
- Destruction
- Offshoring
- Legal and regulatory issues
Limiting use, 
disclosure and 
retention
- Transforming and sharing
- Archival
- Destruction
- Unauthorized use of data and access control
- Audit, monitoring and accountability
- Storage, retention and destruction of data
Accountability - Generation of the 
information
- Use
- Transfer
- Transforming and sharing
- Storage
- Archival
- Destruction
- Audit, monitoring and accountability
- Lack of execution controls, Customers' 
privacy requirements and policies
Table 5-1: Relationship among privacy requirements, data life-cycle phases and issues
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Notice, openness and transparency
This requirement affects all phases of data management. This is in line with the importance that
several authors give to the necessity of users to be aware what is done and what happens with
their data at every moment and that their privacy requirements are met.  Transparency is vital
for generating trust, and providing customers with complete awareness of cloud details and
functions definitely helps to achieve this goal.
Customers should carefully review privacy policies and SLAs to make sure that no privacy gaps
are  uncovered,  and  ensure  which  information  is  collected  from  the  vendor.  Guidelines,
frameworks and suggestions described in section 4.3.2.1.1 – Data Outsourcing: General issues
– like the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) or APEC, and the custom privacy policy generation
and negotiation like those in section 4.3.2.1.2 – Lack of execution controls, customers' privacy
requirements and policies – should help customers identify and select cloud providers whose
policies ensure transparency.
However, the lack of standards and compliance issues require customers to put extra efforts on
assessing privacy risks and compare different cloud vendors. The proposed solutions may ease
this  task  but,  as  suggested  by  Gellman  [SLR18]  in  section  4.3.2.1.2,  further  research  is
necessary on this area. This way, both customers and cloud providers could benefit from more
transparency and safety.
Note that without transparency and event notification, other requirements may be affected or
violated. Even though thanks to Cloud Computing customers are abstracted of implementation
details and complexity,  hiding certain aspects like which cloud providers participate in their
architecture and service composition (see section 4.3.2.1.8 -  Multiple service composition)  or
the location of data can raise serious problems. Accountability could prove useful to make sure
that everything works the way it is expected,  and Policy integration frameworks like the one
proposed by [SLR3] could help in making sure that in the service chain policies are not violated
at  any  step.  (see   section  4.3.2.1.1. –  Lack  of  execution  controls  and  customers'  privacy
requirements – for more information).
Compliance
Legislation  is  an  entity  that  should  be  satisfied  at  every  moment,  so  it  is  logic  that  this
requirement affects every phase of the data life-cycle. However, as it can be noted by reading
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section 4.3.2.2 – Offshoring – legislation issues basically raise ethical and cross-jurisdictional
matter which may conflict with companies' and customers' interests and rights. 
As explained by several authors, revision of several privacy laws is necessary to cover the
privacy gaps that generate these conflicts.
Accountability
This requirement  affects  all  phases of  data life-cycle as every data access or modification
should be tracked. As we could see in section 4.3.2.1.6 – Audit, monitoring and accountability -,
accountability  is shown as a solution to provide more control and awareness to customers,
favouring transparency, solving the related issues. As we have explained in other requirements,
accountability is a requirement that greatly benefits the fulfilment of basic privacy principles.
CSP should  allow  customers  audit  their  services  and  provide  them with  monitoring  tools.
However, accountability requires collecting data, so, as explained in the literature in section
4.3.2.1.6,  users  need  to  be  aware  which  data  is  collected.  Once  again,  research  and
development of standards and certifications can ease the finding, comparison and assessment
of cloud vendors.
Security safeguards
This requirement  affects  all  phases of  data life-cycle,  as data should be,  according to the
description of the requirement, always protected regardless of the phase.
Across  the SLR we have seen several  technologies  and approaches that  aim at  covering
several  vulnerabilities  and  weaknesses  that  threaten  data  confidentiality.  Some  reviewed
technological proposals are those described in section 4.3.1 – Virtualization – to protect against
virtualization vulnerabilities and ensure isolation, section 4.3.2.1.7 – Unauthorized use of data
and access control –  like IAM  to ensure that data is only accessed by authorized people,
section 4.3.3 – Encryption – to protect data privacy and confidentiality through all stages of the
data, from generation to transmission, storage and processing,  and section 4.3.4 – Storage,
retention and destruction of data – to ensure that deleted data is not accessed any more by
someone.
Choice, consent and control
This requirement affects the generation of information, use, and archival phases of the data
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life-cycle. Customers should have the freedom to choose the information they want to publish
(generation of information), decide with who they share that information and how is it managed
(use), and decide how long this information is available (archival).
In the literature, we have seen in section 4.3.2.1.7 – Unauthorized use of data and access
control – that it is rather complex to make sure that data is safe all of the time. A malicious
intent from a cloud provider (e.g. a rogue employee) may harm data and remain unnoticed by
taking  advantage  of  a  possible  vulnerability.  As  proposed  by  Cavoukian  [SLR22],
privacy-enhanced technologies coupled with accountability mechanisms can help preventing or
minimizing damaging effects.
However, we do not think that these measures are enough. As suggested by Takade et al.
[SLR24]  in  the  same section,  trust  and following best  practices  are  an important  factor  to
guarantee usage of  data in  an agreed way with the customers.  As an additional  to  boost
trustiness,  a  possible  suggestion  could  be  the  development  and composition  of
compensatory schemas in policies and SLAs (either technologically by for instance solving
the issue under a certain amount of time, or economic compensation).
Regarding the archival  of  information,  no solutions or  suggestions have been found in  the
literature  for  issues related about  who enforces  retention  policies,  and how to prevent  the
concentration of data from multiple customers on a single machine and how to assess the best
isolation.
About who enforces retention policies, throughout the SLR we have seen about the importance
of defining clear policies and SLAs. Retention policies are not an exception,  and as no direct
evidence or solution has been found in the literature, we suggest customers to carefully review
SLAs and keep well defined requirements.
About  data  concentration,  combination  and  commingling,  Cloud  Computing  consists  on  a
multi-tenant environment. It is obvious that if your data is stored alongside the data of a big
company  that  contains  high  valuable  information,  the  machine  where  that  data  is  stored
becomes much more attractive to attackers and hence, the chance your information is affected
may rise as well.
Further research needs to be done over this issue.  One possible  line of research could be
extending  data  isolation  algorithms like  those  used  in  Virtualization  technologies  (i.e.
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machine  assignation  algorithms)  to  provide  a  certain  weight  to  data  depending  on  its
importance and define a “maximum weight” that every machine can support (it is assumed that
the infrastructure works in a distributed network) in order to divide value concentration. This
way, if a machine suffers an attack, the harm per customer would lower. We believe that, in
case of  privacy breach,  risking a fraction of  personal  data of  ten customers is  better  than
exposing a big chunk of personal data from a single customer. Once again, this is just a simple
proposal with the objective of pointing a direction for researchers and open discussion.
Purpose
This  requirements  affects  the  use,  archival  and  destruction phases  of  the  data  life-cycle.
According to the description of the requirement, purpose is related to the scope of usage of
data (use) and storing (archival), and if  data is no longer necessary and retention time has
passed, it should be destroyed to prevent unnecessary information breaches.
As we have seen in section 4.3.2.1.7 – Unauthorized use of data and access control – and
explained  in  the choice,  consent  and  control  requirement,  trust,  policies,  standards  and
certification development are regarded as the best approaches to be confident that data is used
accordingly.
Scope / minimisation
This  requirements  affects  the  use,  archival  and  destruction phases  of  the  data  life-cycle.
Reasons for this assignment are trivial, as this requirement needs to keep consistency with the
Purpose  requirement.  If  the  usage,  sharing  and  storage  of  data has  to  be limited  for  the
purpose it was collected, then the data collected should only be the necessary one to fulfil that
purpose. Otherwise extra collected unnecessary data may raise alerts on the customer and
affect trust.
Access and accuracy
This requirement affects the storage and transforming and sharing. The reason is that storage
requires proper technologies to ensure that data is accessed only by authorized parties.
Through  the  review  we  have  seen  several  technologies  like  the  Identity  and  Access
Management (IAM) and User-centric Identity Management (IDM) which allow users to handle
their own personal information and determine who has the right to access it.
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Even though we have not found direct evidence, accountability could serve as a mean to track
how is  data managed and who access what  data,  and encryption algorithms help keeping
communication and transmission of credentials safe. More research should be done in this area
to confirm this.
Limiting use, disclosure and retention 
This requirements affects the transforming and sharing, archival and destruction phases of the
data life-cycle. 
As  explained  in  accountability,  and  access  and  accuracy  requirements,  accountability  and
Identity Management protocols can be a way forward ensuring that data usage is limited for use
to specific parties defined by customers.
Regarding retention, no direct evidence in the literature has been found to ensure that data is
kept  no  longer  than  requested.  However,  once  again,  approaches  like  accountability,  and
reviewing privacy policies to ensure that they are aligned with requirements could prove good
solutions.
At this point, we have analysed and summarized the results of the Systematic Literature Review
performed in Chapter 4. After this discussion, we are in shape to provide the answers to the review
questions we posed for our SLR in Chapter 3. 
5.2. The review questions: answers
This section will propose an answer to the questions posed for the Systematic Literature Review
(see section 3.1.1)
Q1. What is the impact of privacy and confidentiality requirements in Cloud Computing
architectures?
As we have seen through the SLR, privacy and confidentiality have a relevant impact on the design
of Cloud  Computing  architectures  and  models,  the  definition  of  stakeholders'  roles  and  the
necessary  technologies to maintain the required levels of confidentiality.
Through analysing privacy and confidentiality issues and challenges we have learned that data in
the Cloud has to follow a specific life-cycle to ensure that this information is properly protected and
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managed. Most proposed solutions and suggestions revolve around protecting this data throughout
all phases and fulfilling a set of privacy requirements. 
From  the  SLR,  privacy  and  confidentiality  impacts  Cloud  Computing  architectures  by  forcing
stakeholders to alter cloud service models taking data protection into account and adding extra
technologies to support these changes. The impact could be resumed in the following points:
 Cloud vendors need to provide a strong, robust and reliable technological base in their
cloud implementations to provide a good quality service while protecting data with efficient
encryption, isolation and access control algorithms. 
 Cloud vendors need to properly manage the data life-cycle and define privacy models to
enable  organizations  have  more  control  and  management  over  their  data.  The
implementation of standards, following best practices frameworks and providing monitoring
and accountability capabilities to customers help into achieving this goal.
 Cloud vendors need to provide consistent, clear and compliant policies to customers and
offer  contractual  negotiation  at  a  small  fee  (like  Privacy-as-a-Service)  to  suit  customer
requirements.
 Cloud vendors should properly delete data and that  it  is  not  accessible in any way,  as
storage resources are constantly reused in a Cloud Computing environment.
 Cloud vendors should provide customers with information about the location of their data
and store it on servers located in low legal risk jurisdictions.
 Cloud Customers require mechanisms to have a clear understanding of their own privacy
and structural requirements, define their business specification to choose an appropriate
cloud vendor whose policies fit with their requirements and assess  the risks associated
with moving to the cloud. 
To  sum up,  and  as  Andreas  Weiss  pointed  out  in  our  interview (refer  to  Appendix  C)  Cloud
Providers  must  offer  security  and confidence  on  customers'  data  through a  solid  and  reliable
business model. This way trust can be built up among customers leading to an increase of Cloud
adopters.
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Q2. Which  are  the  currently  identified  issues and  challenges  regarding  privacy  and
confidentiality in Cloud Computing platforms? What are some of the solutions proposed
to solve these issues?
Through Chapter 4 we have identified and classified several issues and challenges found in the
literature and established relationships among works in order to find more non-explicit issues and
gaps.  The  most  mentioned  issues  in  the  literature  regard  to  virtualization,  data  outsourcing
(specially  issues  regarding  fitting  customers'  privacy  requirements,  audit  and  monitoring,
unauthorized uses and access controls),  legal issues and encryption.  It is no surprise that these
challenges are the most relevant given that virtualization is the core technology that enables Cloud
Computing (see section 2.5 – Underlying technologies) and that moving sensitive data out of the
boundaries of company's control and sharing responsibility with unknown parties has inherent risks
and compliance issues with laws.
Some reviewed issues or challenges may not have a specified solution in the literature. However,
sometimes due to the nature of some issues, they may be related with solutions provided by other
authors.  In  the analysis  performed in section 5.1 and throughout  chapter 4  we  discussed and
proposed several alternatives, directions and linking of works that may help solving issues that in
the literature did not have a direct and specific solution.
However, given the commercial nature of Cloud Computing, it is surprising that there had not been
much about the cost expenses of ensuring privacy, being discussions about ethics and trustiness
the most predominant in the gathered literature. Probably, given that confidentiality is a subset of
privacy which just focuses on protecting information leakage, that could hinder our searching in the
literature, excluding lots of useful results which could bring a more extended and accurate answer
to this question. In chapter 6 we propose future work with the aim of improving this systematic
review.
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Chapter 6: Final Conclusions and Future work
6.1. Conclusion
In this Master Thesis we have provided an State-of-the-Art about privacy and confidentiality issues
in Cloud Computing, focused in the area  of  privacy and confidentiality and providing the reader
with a portion of  the current  research background in this  field.  The main objective  was giving
readers an  insight  of  what  is  Cloud Computing,  and provide an overview of  several  research
initiatives regarding this topic.
First, in chapter 2 we reviewed general aspects of Cloud Computing which enables newcomers to
this paradigm to understand what is it and which are its general aspects. Afterwards, in chapter 3
we documented our literature gathering strategy for the topic of privacy and confidentiality, then
exposed the results of this search in chapter 4 in the form of a Systematic Literature Review.
Finally, in chapter 5 we discuss the results obtained in chapter 4 and extracted some conclusions
and defined research paths by establishing relationships among requirements, phases and found
issues, which gave us an idea of the impact of privacy and confidentiality in cloud architectures and
requirements.
Our work provides scientific value to the community by reviewing, structuring, ordering all the found
evidence in a categorized way, allowing researchers and practitioners to quickly identify their areas
of  interest  and which proposals  exist  to  tackle existing issues and challenges on privacy and
confidentiality under Cloud Computing paradigm.
Cloud computing is a challenge specially for organizations which operate around the world, facing
sometimes conflicting privacy rules  and regulations.  Organizations need to adopt  a systematic
approach to addressing privacy in the cloud and integrate privacy risk management frameworks in
their business models. Suggestions like the ones offered by NIST Guidelines [SLR20] and ENISA
[SLR19]  can  prove  a  useful  starting  point. However,  given  the  complexity  of  existing  global
legislation, we recommend to look for legal advice depending on the importance of data stored in
the cloud.
As a last personal conclusion, I could learn to stay in touch with research methods, and learned to
interpret and understand on-going research and immature proposals.  I  also  learned to perform
Systematic Reviews and the importance of following the so called “scientific method”, documenting
in  detail  searches  and  results  to  produce  reproducible,  verifiable  and  reliable  output.  A well
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performed Systematic Literature Review enables to easily keep an updated state-of-the-art over a
specific topic by re-applying its research method from time to time as long as sources, searches
and exclusion criteria are clearly defined.
We are aware that this Master Thesis has some weaknesses in the searches, basically due to the
search  expression  we used,  as  documented  in  several  parts  through  the  review.  In  the  next
section, we describe and propose future work to improve the quality of the work we offer in this
document.
6.2. Future work
The first  thing we noted while working on the Systematic  Literature Review is  that  filtering by
confidentiality eliminated a lot of results which may have uncovered more issues related to privacy.
We found that confidentiality is a subset, an attribute of privacy (dedicated to establish ways to
protect  from  data  leakages)  alongside  privacy-preservability  (which  deals  with  legislation  and
ethical matters), accountability (tracking of data) and integrity (which deals with the accuracy of
data).
This means that we think it is somewhat impractical to pretend doing an unbiased and exhaustive
search  over  privacy  and  confidentiality  issues  at  the  same time without  harming  and  biasing
privacy. We should either have looked for privacy in general, or focus on confidentiality and data
protection (see section 3.1.2.2 – Keyword finding).
As  future  work  or  proposal  for  researchers  interested  in  the  topic,  we  visualise  two  ways  of
improving this Master Thesis and increasing the quality of the search expression by using the
same keywords we found:
1) Focusing on confidentiality: as we have explained, confidentiality regards to the protection
of data and prevention of leakages. The most relevant keywords that match this description
are confidentiality, attack detection, recovery (of data loss), protection, data, access control.
Mixing these keywords in a proper search expression may give relevant results which may
provide  more  insight  on  issues  we  reviewed  like  virtualization,  access  control  and
encryption, approaches that aim at providing data protection in Cloud Computing.
2) Focusing on privacy preservability: by focusing on this attribute, we could gather more and
deeper evidence on ethical issues regarding privacy on Cloud Computing, like discussions
over legislation, interaction and relationship between Cloud Customer and Cloud Provider,
privacy risk assessment and frameworks for requirement negotiation with CSPs.
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Finally, we could provide an experimental basis to all the reviewed issues to gather more evidence,
have a surface for testing and comparison and detect more technical gaps and challenges. We
would do this by providing a proof-of-concept to privacy in Cloud Computing, comparing and study
in-detail the data security mechanisms of several open-source cloud vendors like Eucalyptus [32],
OpenNebula  [31]  and Nimbus [33] in  order  to  find  which approaches  do they  implement  and
compare them to popular and more advanced proprietary clouds like Amazon EC2 or Microsoft
Azure.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Table A-1 shows a list of relevant terms and abbreviations that appear across this document with 
their definitions.
Term Definition
Accountability The capability of identifying with undeniable evidence who triggered what event to the data.
Audit and 
monitoring
Deals with how can organizations monitor and control the activities of 
their Cloud Service Providers over their data and watch what 
happened in the Cloud system, with the objective to assure that 
privacy requirements, SLA and compliance with laws are enforced 
when their personal information is in the cloud
API
An Application Programming Interface is a series of software routines 
and development tools that comprise an interface between a computer
application and lower-level services and functions (such as the 
operating system, device drivers, and other software applications). 
APIs serve as building blocks for programmers putting together 
software applications. In the context of cloud computing, APIs are sets 
of web services methods for accessing/manipulating cloud resources.
Asymmetric 
encryption
The use of two different keys, first for encryption (public key) and then 
for decryption (private key) of data.
Authentication The act of confirming the identity of an individual or system.
Authorization The act of specifying access rights to resources or functionality.
Confidentiality Is a property of privacy that ensures that no information is made available to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.
CSP A Cloud Service Provider provides and manages services of cloud computing platform.
Elasticity The capability of a system to increase or decrease its computing resources as needed. 
Hybrid cloud
An environment consists in a combination of private and public clouds 
where an organization may run non-core applications in a public cloud,
while maintaining core applications and sensitive data in-house in a 
private cloud.
Hypervisor
A software/hardware platform in a virtualization system that manages 
multiple Virtual Machines and allows several operating systems to run 
on a host computer concurrently.
IaaS Infrastructure as a Service is the delivery of computer infrastructure as 
 136 Appendix A: Glossary
a service where OS and applications can be deployed.
IDM, IAM Identity management and Identity and Access Management is the management of the identity life cycle.
ISP An Internet Service Provider is a company that offers its customers access to the Internet.
ITIL
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library is a set of concepts, 
policies and best practices for managing IT infrastructure, 
development, and operations.
Key management
Provisions made in a cryptography system design that are related to 
the generation, exchange, storage, safeguarding, use, vetting, and 
replacement of keys.
Multitenancy Multitenancy is the capability to allow multiple users share and use resources at the same time.
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology is a standards organization and measurement standards laboratory.
OAuth
An open authorization protocol standard that lets users give third-party 
websites limited access to their data without giving away their 
passwords. The OAuth protocol enables websites or applications 
(consumers) to access protected resources from web services (service
providers) via an API, without requiring users to disclose their service 
provider credentials to those consumers.
OpenID
An open, decentralized, free framework for a user-centric digital 
identity. OpenID eliminates the need for multiple usernames across 
different websites, simplifying your online experience.
Outsourcing Refers to the export and delegation of several business processes to third party companies.
PaaS Platform as a Service is a delivery model whereby cloud vendors offer a development studio solution through the cloud.
Privacy Privacy relates to the collection, use, disclosure and destruction of personal data.
Private cloud A deployment model that emulates public cloud computing, but on a private network.
Public cloud
A cloud service that is hosted, operated, and managed by a third-party 
vendor from one or multiple data centres, and offered to multiple 
customers.
SaaS
Software as a Service is a model of software deployment whereby a 
provider licenses an application to customers for use as a service 
through the cloud.
SAML
Security Assertion Markup Language is an XML-based standard for 
exchanging authentication and authorization data between security 
domains—that is, between an identity provider (a producer of 
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assertions) and a service provider (a consumer of assertions)
Scalability The capability of a system to scale its capacity without loosing performance.
SLA A service-level agreement is a part of a service contract where the level of service is formally defined.
Symmetric 
encryption
Use of a single secret key for both the encryption and decryption of 
data.
Virtualization
The creation of a virtual (rather than actual) version of something, such
as an operating system, a storage device, an application, or network 
resources.
VPN
A virtual private network is a computer network in which some of the 
links between nodes are carried by open connections or virtual circuits 
in some larger networks (such as the Internet), as opposed to running 
across a single private network.
XACML
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language is a declarative access 
control policy language implemented in XML and a processing model, 
describing how to interpret the policies.
Table A-1: Terms and definitions related to Cloud Computing
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Appendix B: Popular Cloud Vendors
This section will list and describe some of the most popular Cloud Computing providers, with the
aim of giving readers awareness about the Cloud market.
Amazon EC2
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) offers IaaS which allows customers to launch and
manage server instances  which run under the Xen virtualization technology. After creating and
starting an instance, users can  fully control  all  the software stack and  upload  applications and
make changes to it, and finally bundle an image machine, launching an identical copy of that image
whenever and wherever necessary, as EC2 also provides the ability to place instances in multiples
locations, allowing for an inexpensive and low latency network connectivity, EC2 machine images
are stored in and retrieved from Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), which stores data
as objects that are grouped in buckets. Each object contains from 1 byte to 5 gigabytes of data.
Buckets must be explicitly created before they can be used.
EC2 can be monitored  with  Amazon CloudWatch,  a  management  tool  to  collect  and process
information to obtain metrics like CPU usage, network input/output, disk read/write operations, etc.
Microsoft Windows Azure platform
Microsoft Windows Azure platform  offers PaaS  and provides tools for developers that ease the
deployment and development of  Windows-based applications.  It  consists in three components,
each of them providing a specific set of services to customers: 
 Windows  Azure,  provides  a  Windows-based  environment  for  running  applications  and
storing data on servers in data centers. 
 SQL Azure provides data services in the cloud based on SQL Server, providing a database
management system (DBMS) in the cloud.
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 .NET  Services  offer  distributed  infrastructure  services  to  cloud-based  and  local
applications,  facilitating the creation of distributed applications.  Windows Azure supports
applications built with the .NET Framework and other languages like C#, Visual Basic and
C++,  and developers can create web applications using technologies such as ASP.NET
and Windows Communication Foundation (WCF). .NET Services also offers the Access
Control  component,  which provides  a  cloud-based  implementation  of  single  identity
verification.
Windows Azure platform offers monitoring services with software called the Fabric Controller. With
each application  in the cloud, the users upload a configuration file that provides an XML-based
description of what the application needs.  This file allows  the  Fabric  Controller  to  decide where
new applications should run, choosing physical servers to optimize hardware utilization.
Google App Engine
Google  App Engine is  a  PaaS  used to deploy  web applications  in  Google  data  centers.  The
currently supported  programming  languages  are  Python  and  Java,  and  web  frameworks  like
Django,  CherryPy,  Pylons,  and  web2py,  as  well  as  a  custom  Google-written  web  application
framework similar to JSP or ASP.NET. Google handles deploying code to a cluster, monitoring,
failover, and launching application instances as necessary.
AbiCloud
Abicloud is a cloud computing platform is an open-source cloud platform used to build, integrate
and manage public, private and hybrid cloud in the homogeneous environments. Using Abicloud,
user can easily and automatically deploy and manage the server, storage system, network, virtual
devices and applications and so on.  Abicloud supports virtual machine platforms like VirtualBox,
VMWare and Xen. The main difference between Abicloud and other cloud computing platforms is
its powerful web-based management function and its core encapsulation manner. 
Abicloud can be used to deploy and implement private cloud as well as hybrid cloud according to
the cloud providers’ request and configuration. It can also manage EC2 according to the rules of
protocol.
Eucalyptus
Eucalyptus (which stands for  Elastic Utility Computing Architecture for Linking Your Programs To
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Useful Systems) is an open-source implementation of Amazon EC2 and compatible with business
interfaces. It implements an elastic computing structure which uses clusters or workstations with a
standard based on service level protocol that permit users lease network for computing capability.
Currently, Eucalyptus is compatible with EC2 from Amazon, and may support more other kinds of
clients  with  minimum  modification  and  extension,  allowing  the  connection  of  customers'
applications.
Nimbus
Nimbus is a cloud computing solution which provides IaaS that was used on scientific research on
its first stages. It allows users to build the computing environment through the deployment of virtual
machines. It includes context agent module, web service resource framework module, EC2 WSDL
module and remote interface module used to manage all kinds of physical resources on the cloud
computing platform.
OpenNebula
OpenNebula is a research project in virtualization infrastructure and cloud computing of European
Union. Like  Nimbus, OpenNebula is also an open source cloud service framework,  and allows
users deploy  and  manage  virtual  machines  on  physical  resources,  set  up  flexible  virtual
infrastructure that can automatically adapt to the change of the service load and deploy any types
of clouds. Though OpenNebula is mainly used to manage private and hybrid infrastructure, it also
supports public cloud platform by providing interfaces and functions to virtual machines, storage
and network management, and so on.
OpenNebula cloud computing platform has many advantages: It can dynamically adjust the scale
of the infrastructure of the cloud platform by increasing the number of hosts and partition clusters
to  meet  different  requirements,  and  can  manage  all  the  virtually  and  physically  distributed
infrastructures and can create infrastructure with the heterogeneous resources at data center. This
can guarantee use the resources more efficiently and can much reduce the number of the physical
resources through the integration of servers which further reduce the cost.
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Appendix C: Interview with Andreas Weiss
Andreas Weiss is the Director of EuroCloud. EuroCloud is an independent non-profit organisation
aimed at creating awareness of Cloud Computing throughout the society and take an active role in
the design of cloud industry processes and standards. This organisation provides the EuroCloud
Certificate to good Cloud Service Providers.
Andreas held a conference on 23rd of March at the Swiss Cloud Conference 2012 in Switzerland.
Cristoph  Fischer,  a  student  of  Business  Information  Technology from the  Zurich  University  of
Applied Sciences who lives in Switzerland could attend to that conference, and we thought it would
be interesting to ask  Andreas Weiss some questions about Cloud Computing, so we prepared
some questions together and formulated them to Andreas in a personal interview.
In this section we will cover the interview Cristoph Fischer (C) and Andreas Weiss (A) held in the
Swiss Cloud Conference 2012.
C: Among all  non-functional  requirements,  is really security the most important one for
customers who have to store their data in a multi-tenant environment? 
A: Yes, indeed. Data is one of the most important and valuable resource any company has, so it's
obvious its their main concern when they partially lose control over it and put it into the Web.
C: If that's so, in which ways do cloud providers offer security and confidence to cloud
customers? 
A: They should have a good business model. It should not happen that the provider can be taken
over or go bankruptcy. For me it's very important to know that the provider has been doing this for
some time!
C: Which are the main "keypoints" that define a cloud provider as a "good one"? Are there
any existing guidelines?
A: Consistency, reliability and motivation - no guidelines so far.
C:  Which are  nowadays  the  most  popular  "Free  clouds"  besides  Google  App  Engine?
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A: When talking about Software as a platform, Facebook/Twitter/Google Analytics are the most
popular free clouds. Then Amazon Cloudfront (simpel CDN) too is pretty popular.
C: Besides big enterprises, do you think most SMEs will slowly move to cloud services in a
near future?
A: Yes, SMEs are the most profitable enterprises when we look at them in the long term (long tail -
most beneficial).
C: What is the latest greatest "hit" or finding regarding Cloud Computing topic?
A: If you mean by "hit" just what people found out recently than it is for sure the fact, that latency
(for the usability) is a big problem for Cloud Providers and their clients. Speed sells and if you can
not  be  on  the  fast  track,  than  you  have  a  problem.  Check
https://cloudsleuth.net/global-provider-view for more information.
C:  Do  you  think  that  every  business  who  wants  to  achieve  a  cost  reduction  in  their
processes should move his data and operations to a cloud? Or there are situations where
cloud is just not worth?
A: No, not every business does benefit from this situation. What needs to be done in the first place
is that somebody writes a good business case. No business case equals to no benefit from the
cloud. I don't have any detailed information about other situations but actually think if  you can
handle the loss of your soft factors, all businesses can achieve cost reduction.
C: Well, these have been all questions I had for you, Andreas. Thank you for your time and
your helpful answers.
A: Thanks to you.
